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Misdemeanor Decriminalization
Alexandra Natapoff*
As the United States reconsiders its stance on mass incarceration,
misdemeanor decriminalization has emerged as an increasingly popular
reform. Seen as a potentialcure for crowded jails and an overburdened defense
bar, many states are eliminatingjailtimefor minor offenses such as marijuana
possession and driving violations, replacing those crimes with so-called
"nonjailable"or "fine-only" offenses. This form of reclassification is widely
perceived as a way of saving millions of state dollars-nonjailableoffenses do
not triggerthe right to counsel-while easing the punitive impact on defendants,
and it has strong support from progressives and conservatives alike.
But decriminalization has a little-known dark side. Unlike full
legalization, decriminalization preserves many of the punitive features and
collateral consequences of the criminal misdemeanor experience, even as it
strips defendants of counsel and other procedural protections. It actually
expands the reach of the criminal apparatus by making it easier-both
logistically and normatively-to impose fines and supervision on an everwidening population, a population that ironically often ends up incarcerated
anyway when they cannot afford fines or comply with supervisory conditions.
The turn to fine-only offenses and supervision, moreover, has distributive
implications. It captures poor, underemployed, drug-dependent, and otherwise
disadvantaged defendants for whom fines and supervision are especially
burdensome, while permitting well-resourced offenders to exit the process
quickly and relatively unscathed. Finally, as courts turn increasingly to fines
and fees to fund their own operations, decriminalizationthreatens to become a
kind of regressive tax, turning the poorest populations into funding fodder for
the judiciary and other government budgets. In sum, while decriminalization
appears to offer relief from the punitive legacy of overcriminalizationand mass
incarceration, upon closer inspection it turns out to be a highly conflicted
regulatory strategy that preserves and even strengthens some of the most
problematic aspects of the massive U.S. penal system.

Associate Dean for Research, Theodore A. Bruinsma Fellow & Professor of Law, Loyola
*
Law School, Los Angeles. Special thanks to Brie Clark, Sharon Dolovich, Doug NeJaime, Michael
Pinard, Bob Weisberg, and participants at the 2014 Southern California Criminal Justice
Roundtable.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. criminal system is at a historical crossroads. In some
ways, the behemoth is becoming kinder and gentler: many jurisdictions
are shortening drug sentences and closing prisons, while crime and
incarceration rates are down. At the same time, the criminal process is
an increasingly intrusive system of surveillance, social stratification,
and behavioral control. Even as we retract certain formal
punishments-primarily
incarceration-we
are
simultaneously
expanding the system's capacity to watch, label, direct, and derail the
lives of a growing population subject to arrest, conviction, and
nonprison punishments. These conflicting forces suggest that we are at
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an important moment of contest, a fundamental dispute over the nature
and future of the penal process itself.
Misdemeanor decriminalization-the reduction of penalties for
minor offenses-is central to this historical moment. At the most
general level, it is central because misdemeanors themselves are so
important, making up the vast bulk of the U.S. system and fueling some
of its most pressing problems. Most Americans experience criminal
justice via the petty offense process; the ten million misdemeanor cases
filed annually comprise around eighty percent of state dockets.
Moreover, the petty offense process drives some large and troubling
dynamics. The misdemeanor machinery is a major source of
overcriminalization; it produces much of the racial skew of the U.S.
criminal population; and it exacerbates the dysfunction of our publicdefense bar, overwhelming public defenders with hundreds, sometimes
thousands, of minor cases. 1 For all these reasons, large-scale changes
in misdemeanor policy, such as decriminalization, have ripple effects
throughout the criminal system.
More specifically, misdemeanor decriminalization is a
profoundly conflicted, sophisticated regulatory practice with farreaching penal and social implications. To start with, in the
misdemeanor context "decriminalization" does not mean "legalization,"
although many people do not realize the significance of the difference. 2
Decriminalization does not render conduct legal. Instead, it typically
reduces penalties, mainly incarceration, for conduct that remains
illegal
and
forbidden.
Accordingly,
while
misdemeanor
decriminalization eases the immediate punitive impact of the penal
system, it leaves in place the vast web of forbidden conduct and its
accompanying law enforcement apparatus.
Decriminalization takes a wide array of forms that carry
different labels and punishments-from the creation of fine-only "civil
infractions" to "nonjailable misdemeanors." Although widely
misunderstood, the distinctions between these policy choices are
enormous. The reclassification of crime into a civil infraction-or "full"
decriminalization-removes an offense from the criminal system
entirely.
Although
the
conduct
remains
punishable,
full
decriminalization can spare offenders many of the collateral
consequences of the criminal process such as arrest or a criminal record.
By contrast, under the more common . practice of "partial"
decriminalization, offenses retain their criminal character and
attendant burdens. Typically, partial decriminalization means that
1.
2.

See infra Part II.
Infra Part III.A.
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defendants cannot be incarcerated for the underlying offense, but it can
take other forms as well, from shortened or deferred sentences to
supervision and treatment. This variety of regulatory options makes
decriminalization a flexible and sophisticated policy tool in ways that
the public conversation often misses.
Decriminalization is now squarely on the agenda as an
increasingly favored response to the American criminal justice
challenge. Commentators on the left and right, the American Bar
Association ("ABA"), the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers ("NACDL"), and numerous scholars have called for
decriminalizing minor offenses as a solution to a wide array of systemic
problems. This consensus is fueled in part by a special legal feature of
misdemeanors: minor offenses that carry no possibility of jailtime do
not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 3 Accordingly,
eliminating incarceration for misdemeanors looks like a kind of winwin: it relieves defendants of the threat of imprisonment while saving
the state millions of dollars in defense, prosecution, and jail costs.
Motivated by persistent fiscal crises, many states have accordingly been
experimenting with the decriminalization of various crimes, most
prominently marijuana possession but also driving on a suspended
license, traffic and other regulatory offenses.
In many ways, this "win-win" story is accurate. As explored
below, decriminalization is an obvious countermeasure to three decades
of criminal law expansion. It reduces incarceration and sometimes
arrest rates. It can ease many of the collateral burdens that formal
criminal conviction imposes. It is an especially promising way of
slowing the criminal branding of so many young men of color who tend
to get swept up for petty crimes such as marijuana possession, loitering,
and other order maintenance offenses. It could eliminate the need for
counsel in hundreds of thousands of cases and thus give a much-needed
reprieve to the struggling public-defense bar. 4 It is for these reasons
that decriminalization is fairly viewed as a progressive silver bullet for
many of the system's most pressing ills.
But the full story is more conflicted. While misdemeanor
decriminalization is in some ways less punitive, in some ways it is more
so, simultaneously preserving, or even expanding, how the criminal
system generates and then punishes offenders. First, decriminalization
maintains many of the collateral, even direct, criminal consequences of
a conviction. Nonjailable misdemeanors are still crimes that trigger the
usual panoply of burdens including arrest, probation and fines, criminal
3.
4.

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
See infra Part IV.
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records, and collateral consequences. Even so-called "nonarrestable"
civil infractions can still derail a defendant's employment, education,
and immigration status, while the failure to pay fines can lead to
contempt citations and incarceration. 5 These burdens, moreover, can be
imposed on offenders quickly, informally, and without counsel, so that
the standard procedural safeguards against wrongful conviction and
overpunishment are lessened, if not eliminated altogether.
Second, decriminalization represents the next generation of the
"net-widening" phenomenon. Net-widening refers to reforms that make
it easier to sweep individuals into the criminal process, and
decriminalization does so in sophisticated ways. Primarily, it makes it
possible to reach more offenders by simplifying the charging process
and eliminating counsel, along with other forms of due process. But it
also heightens the impact of the net by turning to supervision and fines
as indirect, long-term constraints on defendant behavior, and by
extending the informal consequences of a citation or conviction deep
into offenders' social and economic lives. The widening net, moreover,
is not colorblind: decriminalization risks further racializing the
selection process as police are empowered to stop and cite young black
men more freely without the constraints of criminal adjudication or the
threat of defense counsel.
Third, and perhaps most covertly, decriminalization functions as
a kind of regressive tax, creating perverse incentives for low-level courts
that increasingly rely on fines and fees to fund their own operations.
Without the protections of defense counsel and the other resource
constraints of the criminal process, courts and law enforcement are free
to mete out decriminalized infractions to an ever-widening population
in order to generate revenue for their own operations. This is no idle
threat. As the New York Times has complained, "minor offenders who
cannot pay a fine or fee often find themselves in jail cells," 6 and the
millions of dollars that lower courts currently collect from defendants
constitute a large and growing percentage of judicial operating
budgets.' In other words, by decriminalizing minor offenses, we risk
turning the most vulnerable population into funding fodder for the very
institution from which we are trying to protect them. 8 That,

See infra Part V.
5.
Editorial, Return of Debtors' Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at A16 (calling the
6.
practice "indefensible").
7.
Infra Part V.A.2.
A New York Times columnist recently referred to this phenomenon as "poverty
8.
capitalism." Thomas B. Edsall, Op-Ed, The Expanding World of Poverty Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2014. Or as Stephen Bright put it, "[W]e end up balancing the budget on the backs of the
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paradoxically, makes decriminalization a kind of regressive economic
policy masquerading as progressive penal reform.
The long-term benefits of decriminalization are thus unequally
distributed
throughout
the
criminal
justice
population.
Decriminalization permits minor offenders to avoid heavier
punishments, typically through paying a fine or submitting to a brief
period of supervision. It allows wealthy and otherwise socially secure
defendants to exit the system relatively easily by paying the fine or
complying with various other conditions. But for defendants who cannot
quickly pay or who cannot easily conform to the soft behavioral
demands of supervision, decriminalization is not really an authentic
exit strategy. Eventually, soft demands convert to hard measures that
look exactly like traditional retributive punishment: onerous financial
debt, long-term intrusive supervision, and even incarceration.
For such reasons, there is something quietly misleading about
the current decriminalization conversation. Individuals may believe
that racking up minor decriminalized offenses will have no impact on
their records or futures, even though it very likely will. Policymakers
may promote decriminalization as an egalitarian and racially healing
reform, even though it can have the opposite effect. Voters and
legislators may embrace decriminalization proposals in lieu of
legalization in the mistaken belief that they are equivalent.
In sum, decriminalization is best understood as a highly
conflicted regulatory strategy. It jettisons some punishments while
retaining others, expands the reach of the criminal process into new
arenas, and alters its economic significance for courts and offenders
alike. While many people understand decriminalization centrally as a
form of leniency-a rollback of the punitive criminal apparatus and a
strike against mass incarceration-the impact on some offenders may
be the same or even more punishing in the long run. This dynamic,
moreover, is largely veiled because many of the detrimental
consequences of decriminalized offenses do not technically qualify as
"punishment" at all and so they fly beneath the legal radar even as they
extend the influence of criminalization to more individuals, families
and communities. This makes decriminalization a double-edged sword.
Even as it rejects the overtly punitive, debilitating quality of prison,
decriminalization offers ways of maintaining, even expanding, the

poorest people in society." Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for
Probation,N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at Al.
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criminal system as a governance mechanism for a wide range of social
behaviors and environments. 9
Decriminalization is not a stand-alone phenomenon. It
exemplifies a larger institutional and social compromise: the embrace
of more diffuse and less formal modes of punishment as a way of
adapting America's massive criminal apparatus to a new age of
resource scarcity and unease about mass incarceration. 10 All kinds of
offenders are increasingly subject to a wide array of what I'll call
"microcontrols": small-scale penal intrusions, formal and informal, that
shape offenders' lives." These microcontrols range from the constant
intrusions and anxieties of supervision to the financial pressures
exerted by fines and fees to the informal but influential ways that a
citation, arrest, or conviction alters an offender's relationship to police,
employers, schools, hospitals, social services, and other institutions. 12
Decriminalization relies on precisely such microcontrols to displace
some of the regulatory work currently performed by mass incarceration.
It thus epitomizes the historical crossroads at which our criminal
system currently stands.
This Article provides a theoretical and empirical overview of the
misdemeanor decriminalization phenomenon. It exposes the complex
machinery of decriminalization, its conflicted commitments and
contradictory effects, and its deep significance for our criminal justice
culture. It is the fourth in a series of articles analyzing the influence of
the misdemeanor process over the U.S. criminal system as a whole. 13 It
proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the crucial role played by
misdemeanors in the U.S. criminal system and the concomitant
9.
Compare Jonathan Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaningof
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 245 (2013)
(forecasting a possible resurgence of the "medical" or rehabilitative model of corrections), with
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love"` Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
and
through
transformation"
how
"preservation
(1996)
(describing
2179
"status regime modernization" occur when seemingly progressive reforms actually modernize and
strengthen the status quo).
10. See Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass
Incarceration,DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 132.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. Wayne Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2013)
(documenting "the gamut of negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of
conviction").
13. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff,
Misdemeanors]; Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1043 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors]; Alexandra
Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Gideon
Skepticism]; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, II ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. (forthcoming
2015); Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MAKING SENSE
OF WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., forthcoming 2015).
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significance of decriminalization. Part III clarifies the distinction
between decriminalization and legalization, and then examines the
wide array of forms that decriminalization can and currently does take.
Importantly, it distinguishes between "full" decriminalization, in which
an offense is removed from the criminal apparatus and rendered
entirely civil, and the more common "partial" decriminalization, in
which minor offenses retain various punitive features.
Part IV surveys the substantial benefits that decriminalization
offers defendants, state criminal systems, and the integrity of the
criminal process more generally. Part V supplies the other, heretofore
unexamined half of the picture by examining the burdens that
decriminalization continues to impose on offenders, including
persistent punishments, collateral consequences, net-widening, and the
threat that courts will expand the infraction machinery in order to fund
their own operations.
In Part VI, I take a step back and ask what decriminalization
reveals about the evolving purposes and significance of our criminal
process. Although the U.S. criminal system appears to be relinquishing
some of its most punitive commitments, decriminalization is not
antithetical to the "culture of control." Instead, it is part of the growth
of a vast net of formal and informal burdens, intrusions, and stigmatic
labels imposed on offenders, even those who never spend a day in jail.
These microcontrols include criminal records, collateral consequences
and employment stigma, long-term legal debt, and a variety of social
exclusions, all of which extend the consequences of a minor brush with
the criminal system deep into a person's future. Insofar as
decriminalization strengthens this net, it represents not so much the
devolution of the penal state as an upgrade to a more modern, diffuse
approach to crime-based governance.
The Article concludes on a pragmatic note, emphasizing that
while decriminalization may be a political compromise with the penal
behemoth, it nevertheless offers a valuable-albeit imperfect and
partial-antidote for some of the worst aspects of the misdemeanor
process and the system as a whole. Under "full" rather than "partial"
decriminalization, offenders get their best chance to avoid arrest,
jailtime, and permanent records. This is the state's best option to reduce
incarceration and potentially keep millions of people from being marked
and burdened as criminals. Whether decriminalization more profoundly
alters the underlying balance between penal and democratic
governance remains to be seen.
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II. THE MISDEMEANOR FRAMEWORK

Although it sounds counterintuitive, our criminal system is
mostly about misdemeanors. Every year in the U.S., approximately 2.3
million felony cases are filed compared to ten million misdemeanors. 1 4
Comprising around eighty percent of most state dockets, petty offenders
make up the majority of prosecutorial and defenders caseloads, half of
government probation office cases, and fuel a growing private probation
industry.15 Rarely recognized as such, the misdemeanor is in fact the
paradigmatic U.S. criminal case: most cases are misdemeanors, most of
what the system does is generate minor convictions, and most
Americans who experience the criminal system do so via the petty
offense process.
The misdemeanor process is the gateway to the criminal system,
the primary door through which Americans encounter the penal process
and acquire a criminal record. 16 But this massive, influential apparatus
does not obey the standard rules of criminal law and procedure. Unlike
its felony counterpart, the misdemeanor arena is severely
14

Compare COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003 38

(Brian Ostrom et al. eds., 2003) (counting 2.3 million felony filings in the forty-six states for which
data was available), available at http://cdml6501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/
ctadminlid/606, with R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2012 STATE TRIAL COURT CASELOADS 13 (2014) (counting

approximately 1.9 felony filings in thirty-four states), available at http:// www.courtstatistics.org/
~/medialmicrosites/files/csp/ncsc-ewsc-webnov_25_14.ashx, archived at http://perma.cc/YN9V4PXX; see also NAT'L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (Apr. 2009) (extrapolating

available
from
16 states),
data
from 2006
filings
misdemeanor
national
https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/, archivedat https://perma.cc/AC5A-KSAX.

at

See NAT'L Assoc. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
15.
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (Apr. 2009), available at

https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/,
RIGHTS

WATCH,

PROFITING FROM

archived at https://perma.cc/AC5A-KSAX; HUMAN

PROBATION:

AMERICA'S "OFFENDER-FUNDED"

PROBATION

INDUSTRY, 1, 16 (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/02/05profitingprobation-0, archived at http://perma.cc/85V5-FLLQ ("[H]undreds of thousands of Americans[,
with over 250,000 in Georgia alone,] are sentenced to probation with private companies every year
by well over 1,000 courts across the U.S."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PROBATION

AND

PAROLE

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES,

2012

(Dec.

2013),

available

at

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflppusl2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ES78-CN3Z.
16. Approximately thirty percent of adult Americans have some form of criminal record.
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON
CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 51 (June 2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/

content/pub/pdf/ag-bgchecks-report.pdf,

archived at http://perma.cc/G7WT-P9KD;

MICHELLE

NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION NEED NOT
APPLY: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT, 3, 27 n.2

http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_MillionNeed-Notavailable at
(Mar.
2011),
Apply.pdf?nocdn=1, archived at http://perma.cc/LHD7-9PEZ (sixty-five million American adults
have a criminal record); see also id. at 27 n.2 (noting that this total is underinclusive because some
of the fingerprint databases surveyed did not include misdemeanors).
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underregulated, informal, and sloppy." Arrests for minor crimes are
easily made with little or no evidentiary support. This is especially true
for urban quality-of-life offenses, which often take place in bulk as
police strive to control high-crime neighborhoods.1 8 Once arrested,
defendants may speak with an overworked public defender for mere
minutes before pleading guilty; many plead guilty without talking to a
lawyer at all.' 9 At the same time, the lower courts that handle minor
offenses have become infamous for their indiscriminate speed. Widely
derided as "assembly line," "cattle-herding," and "McJustice," lower
courts rush hundreds of cases through en mass, validating hastily made
plea agreements without scrutiny.2 0
In sum, each stage of the misdemeanor process is characterized
by speed, lack of individuated evidence or adversarial contest, and the
pervasive assumption that offenders are guilty. The resulting ninetyfive percent plea rate generates millions of convictions without the
kinds of procedural or evidentiary checks on which we typically rely to
ensure accuracy and fairness.
This
quick-and-dirty
process
has
deep
substantive
consequences. Because the petty offense process rarely scrutinizes cases
and because nearly everyone pleads guilty, arrests convert easily-in
some places automatically-into convictions. In other words, getting
arrested, particularly for a minor urban disorder offense, can be
tantamount to sustaining a criminal conviction.21 Not only does this
dynamic violate basic liability and proof rules, 22 it has racial

17. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 13 (describing the inaccuracies and lack of
procedural safeguards in the petty offense process).
18. Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 13.
19.

NAT'L Assoc. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 15.

20. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).
21. This dynamic varies between jurisdictions and offenses. In some places and for some
crimes, misdemeanor dismissal rates are relatively high; elsewhere, prosecutorial declination
rates are on the order of two or three percent so that arrests almost always convert to convictions.
Compare Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010) (documenting low prosecutorial declination rates of less
than five percent), and Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecutionand the Fourth Amendment, 59
MD. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2000):
[A]n individual's loss of freedom and the prosecutorial merit of most of those cases stand
or fall solely on a police officer's judgment about the legal sufficiency of the evidence
and of the rules of law applicable to the cited offense(s), and on the officer's judgment
about the merit of an individual case from a public policy perspective.,
with Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,
647 (2014) (documenting high misdemeanor dismissal rates that accompanied a massive increase
in misdemeanor arrest rates in New York).
22. The quantum of evidence sufficient for arrest (probable cause) is by definition insufficient
to establish actual guilt. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (quoting Locke v. United
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significance. Because African American men are disproportionately
subject to arrest for minor disorder and possession crimes, the
misdemeanor process effectively converts racially disparate arrest
policies into formal criminalization. 23 This makes the petty offense
process the first step in the racialization of U.S. crime and the formal
stigmatization of large swaths of the black male population. 24
It is for these reasons that decriminalization holds such
structural promise. It offers a way of scaling back the petty offense
machinery, stemming the flow of millions of people into the criminal
system at the front end, and reducing the disparate impact that petty
offense processing has on the poor and people of color. By easing the
punitive burdens and stigma of misdemeanors, so the story goes, we
might actually be able to shrink the entire carceral state.
III. WHAT IS DECRIMINALIZATION?
A. DecriminalizationVersus Legalization
In some fields, the term "decriminalization" is synonymous with
"legalization." When same-sex rights advocates call for the
decriminalization of gay sex, they mean that the state should get out of
the business of regulating that intimate conduct altogether. 25 Similarly,
when Darryl Brown describes the array of conduct that courts and
legislatures have "decriminalized," he includes conduct that has been
fully legalized-for example, the use of contraception, interracial
marriage, and political speech. 26 In these contexts, decriminalization
and legalization synonymously refer to complete deregulation; the state
no longer has grounds for punishing that behavior in any way.
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)) (noting that probable cause "means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation").
23.

See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 40

(June 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/090613-mj-report-rfs-rell.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/A3VK-AERF (finding marijuana possession arrest rates for African Americans
to be ten, twenty, even thirty times higher than white arrest rates in various jurisdictions).
24. While formal conviction is the most severe form of criminalization, the criminal process
also imposes a wide array of marks, records, detentions, and other collateral consequences short
of actual conviction that can alter an individual's life trajectory. See Part V.A.4.
25.
See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 992 (2011)
(referring to the elimination of antisodomy statutes as "decriminalization").
26. Darryl Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007)
(describing legislative decriminalization broadly as including "repealing or narrowing criminal
statutes, reducing offense severity, and converting low-level crimes to civil infractions"); see also
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS 11-12 (2002) ('The
question I believe should be asked-should drug use be criminalized?-and the question that is
generally asked-should drug use be decriminalized?-are different, and the difference is
important. The right question demands a justification for existing policy.").
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By contrast, in the misdemeanor realm decriminalization does
not mean legalization. 27 Rather, it signifies the reduction or elimination
of traditional criminal penalties for conduct that remains prohibited.28
Only four states, for example, have actually legalized marijuana under
state law. 29 By contrast, dozens of states have decriminalized the
possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use by
eliminating jail penalties or by reclassifying the offense as a fine-only
civil infraction. But marijuana possession in those states remains
illegal and forbidden, even under a civil infraction regime. Similarly,
traffic decriminalization does not authorize people to speed or drive
without a license. It merely reduces or alters the penalties for engaging
in that impermissible behavior.
The difference between legalization and misdemeanor
decriminalization is profound. Legalization represents a roll-back of the
state's regulatory authority, the elimination of state power to punish
certain individual choices, and the concomitant expansion of liberty and
privacy zones. By contrast, decriminalization maintains the full scope
of the state's intrusive powers, softening the consequences of violations
even while validating the underlying prohibition. To be sure,
decriminalization addresses an important proportionality concern
about how we punish, rejecting incarceration in favor of other, less
immediately punitive tools. It does not, however, answer underlying
questions about whether we should punish at all, how big the criminal
system should be, or how large a role it should play in democratic
governance.
To put it in perspective, imagine how we would feel about
Lawrence v. Texas 30 if it had held that same-sex couples could not be
incarcerated for their intimacies, but police could still issue them fine-

27. See State v. Menditto, 80 A.3d 923, 926-30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that
Connecticut reform reclassifying marijuana misdemeanor into noncriminal infraction did not
constitute "legalization" for the purposes of records destruction statute).
28. What Wayne Logan calls "depenalization." Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped:
Decriminalizationand Legalism's Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2015). For
a national survey of decriminalization practices commissioned by the American Bar Association,
see THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR
RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING (Sept. 2010), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlabaladministrativellegal-aid-indigent-defendants/
archived at http://perma.cc/
Is sclaid def aba-tsp-reclassificationreport.authcheckdam.pdf,
J9BN-6VLU.
29. Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upshot/marijuana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska2014,
oregon-and-dc.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg-O, archived at http://perma.cclGFC3-KKSG. Marijuana
remains illegal under federal law.
30.
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down the constitutionality of antisodomy laws).
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only tickets. 31 We would not be appeased by the obvious benefit-"at
least you won't go to prison"-because the rule change would have
preserved the underlying normative regime. Similarly, misdemeanor
decriminalization reaffirms the basic validity of criminalization as a
tool of governance over the most minor forms of conduct and the most
disadvantaged populations.
B. "Full"Versus "Partial"Decriminalization
Misdemeanor decriminalization takes two main forms. "Full"
decriminalization occurs when an offense is taken out of the criminal
realm and reclassified as a civil offense. The conduct remains
prohibited, thereby distinguishing it from legalization, but the
consequences are civil in nature, typically the imposition of a fine
without the creation of a criminal record. These noncriminal,
nonjailable civil offenses are often referred to as "infractions,"
"citations," or "violations" akin to a traffic ticket. 32
Far more commonly, legislatures engage in "partial"
decriminalization by simply eliminating jailtime as possible
punishment for an offense. Such offenses remain fully criminal; they
are reclassified as nonjailable misdemeanors, which retain all the
collateral consequences of a criminal offense except that the defendant
cannot be incarcerated for the offense itself. One of the most significant
consequences of this reclassification is that offenders who do not face
incarceration are not entitled to counsel. 33 For this reason, partial
decriminalization is a popular option with legislatures looking to save
money and advocates who see decriminalization primarily as a cure for
the ills of the overburdened defense bar.34
"Full" and "partial" are conceptual poles at either end of a rich
spectrum: in practice there is a wide range of variations, and
decriminalization takes many forms. 35 Legislatures can retain
or

31. I am indebted to Doug NeJaime for this insight, among many others.
32. But see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2015) (defining disorderly conduct as a
"violation"); id. § 10.00 (defining "violation" as an offense carrying a sentence of no more than
fifteen days imprisonment).
33. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
34. E.g., THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28, at i (noting that most states are
reclassifying offenses into nonjailable misdemeanors while few are creating civil nonjailable
infractions); Roberts, supra note 20, at 289, 302-03 (advocating decriminalization as a way of
improving the public-defense function).
35. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV.
1957, 1983 (2004) (noting the difficulties in distinguishing between minor and serious offenses and
that "the devil is in the details").
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eliminate the police's power to detain a suspect; 36 encourage police to
issue a citation or summons in lieu of arrest; 37 or require offenders to
undergo courses, probation, or other supervisory sentences. 38 In some
jurisdictions, first offenses are nonjailable, but subsequent offenses
trigger incarceration. 3 9 Prosecutors may be given statutory discretion
over so-called "wobblers"-i.e., offenses that can be charged either as an
infraction or a traditional misdemeanor.40
Decriminalization also occurs via institutions other than the
state legislature. An increasing number of American cities have passed
marijuana decriminalization ordinances even though the drug remains
illegal under state law. 4 1 State and local police can effectively
decriminalize offenses by predictably failing to arrest offenders. 42
Prosecutors can decriminalize by declining to prosecute arrests. 43
On the judicial front, court-created diversion programs permit
offenders to avoid certain criminal consequences of their conduct by
voluntarily submitting to supervision. 44 Specialized courts such as drug
or veterans' courts also engage in partial decriminalization by
siphoning offenders out of traditional criminal courts and engaging in
alternative forms of supervision, sanction, and treatment. 45

36. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.16.050, 12.25.030 (2014) (requiring police officers who arrest
minors for the nonmisdemeanor violation of alcohol possession to cite the minors and release them
to their parent or guardian).
37. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(13) (LexisNexis 2014) (first marijuana possession
offense is an infraction for which police must issue citation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(2)
(2014) (requiring police to issue summons for marijuana possession offense, provided the offender
provides proof of identity and written promise to appear).
38.
E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(13)(a) (requiring a course for first-time marijuana
possessors); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.336(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2013) (making first-time marijuana
possession a misdemeanor subject to a fine or a drug evaluation); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art.42.12 § 15 (West 2013) (mandating suspended sentences for certain minor drug possession
offenses).
39. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) (requiring a minimum five days of incarceration
for a second possession offense); NEB. REV. STAT. Ann. § 28-416(13)(b) (authorizing imprisonment
up to five days for a second possession offense).
40.

THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28, at 12.

41. See Gary Ridley, Flint DecriminalizationofMarijuanaVote Only 'Symbolic;'ArrestsWill
Continue, City Says, MLIVE (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssfl2012/
11/flintpolice-will-still makem.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AD48-2AY2 (documenting
decriminalization ordinances in Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and Ypsilanti, Michigan).
42. Adam Nagourney, Marijuana, Not Yet Legal for Californians, Might as Well Be, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at Al (describing how California police fail to enforce anti-marijuana laws).
43. Erik Luna, ProsecutorialDecriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 79597 (2012).
44. THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28, at 14-16.
45. See infra Part V.A.3; see also Allegra M. McLeod, DecarcerationCourts:Possibilitiesand
Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605-11 (2012) (surveying alternative
courts).
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In sum, full decriminalization formally moves an offense out of
the criminal and into the civil realm, whereas partial decriminalization
involves a complex combination of altered enforcement patterns,
collateral
and
classifications,
punishments,
adjudications,
a widebecome
has
consequences. In these ways, decriminalization
ranging and flexible policy tool. Sometimes it substantially alters the
workings of the criminal process and the implications for offenders,
while sometimes it is used merely to fine-tune operations.
IV. DECRIMINALIZATION AS THE SOLUTION

Across the political spectrum, calls for decriminalization are
growing louder. While often associated with liberal advocates,
decriminalization supporters include former Texas Governor and 2012
Republican presidential candidate Rick Perry, 46 evangelical minister
Pat Robertson, 47 and libertarian thinktank the Cato Institute.4 8 Seen
as a potential cure for an outsized incarcerated population, an unwieldy
criminal code, and an overburdened defense bar, decriminalization has
become popular both as a way of improving systemic fairness and as a
cost-cutting measure. 49
Many institutions are starting to take a hard look at
decriminalization. In 2010, the ABA Commission on Homelessness and
Poverty urged all jurisdictions "to undertake a comprehensive review of
the misdemeanor provisions of their criminal laws, and, where
appropriate, to allow the imposition of civil fines or nonmonetary civil
remedies instead of criminal penalties."5 0 That same year, an ABAsponsored report called for widespread full decriminalization of minor

46. See Tal Kopan, Rick Perry Mulls DecriminalizingPot, POLITICO (Jan. 24, 2014, 6:30 AM),
archived at http://
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/rick-perry-texas-pot-102559.html,
perma.cc/ACM2-9URA.
See Jesse McKinley, Pat Robertson Says Marijuana Use Should Be Legal, N.Y. TIMES,
47.
March 8, 2012, at A14.
See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, THE CATO INSTITUTE, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN
48.
PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES (2009), available at

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/greenwald-whitepaper.pdf,
perma.cc/X7Q8-MY8V;

archived at http://

Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING

(Gene Healy ed., 2004).
49. See, e.g., Miami May Decriminalize 18 Minor Offenses; Timoney Dubious, CRIME REP.
(Oct. 9, 2009, 11:40 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/crime-and-justice-news/miami-mayarchived at http://perma.cc/AJE3-PRWH
decriminalize-18-minor-offenses-timoney-dubious,
("We're being forced to operate almost like a factory .... We are handling cases that have no
business being in a criminal courthouse." (quoting Miami-Dade Chief County Judge Samuel
Slom)).
50.

COMM'N ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, AM. BAR ASSoc., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF

DELEGATES (Feb. 2010).
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offenses as a cost-saving measure that would ease "problems with
overcrowding, over-burdened prosecutors and public defenders with
unfeasible caseloads and understaffing." 5 1 Surveying national trends,
the report noted that numerous states are contemplating
decriminalization, although most states resist full decriminalization
and instead reduce or eliminate incarceration for certain offenses while
still classifying them as criminal. 52 In a 2012 joint report, the ABA and
the NACDL summed it up as follows:
Current policing strategy floods the criminal justice system with arrests and contributes
to countless prosecutions for myriad petty, non-violent infractions. Reclassification and
diversion are front-end reforms that save significant money for police, courts, corrections
systems, prosecutors, defenders, and ultimately the county or state budget by moving
53
minor infractions out of the criminal justice system.

Marijuana has become something of a poster child. At least
eighteen states have decriminalized the recreational possession of small
amounts of marijuana in one way or another, ranging from actual
legalization in Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, to full
decriminalization in Massachusetts and Connecticut, to partial
decriminalization in states such as Minnesota and Nevada. 54 Sixteen
more states are expected to consider decriminalization in the next two
years.55
Other state experiments in decriminalization include traffic
offenses, regulatory offenses, and urban order maintenance.5 6 King
County, Washington, has a diversionary Relicensing Court for

51.

THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28, at 1.

52. Id. at i. This reluctance reflects a longstanding tradition of giving law enforcement the
power to leverage minor offenses. In a paradigmatic example, as part of his famous zero-tolerance
policing policy, then-New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani persuaded the state legislature to
recriminalize forty minor offenses that had been treated as civil offenses. Clifford Krauss, State
Legislators Agree to Restore Arrests for Minor Offenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/1 1/nyregion/state-legislators-agree-to-restore-arrests-for-minoroffenses.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5MNU-7GDT.
53.
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Assoc., NATIONAL INDIGENT
9
(2012),
available at
REFORM:
THE
SOLUTION
IS
MULTIFACETED
DEFENSE

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/books/1s-sclaid-def national-indigent
defense reform.authcheckdam.pdf, archivedat http:// perma.cc/SG85-Z87V.
54. Josh Harkinson, Map: The United States of Legal Weed, MOTHER JONES, (Nov. 5, 2014,
6:38 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/map-united-states-legal-marijuana-20142016, archivedat http://perma.ccU4TZ-28XF.
55.

Id.

56.
See Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization,Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops,
62 UCLA L. REV. 672 (2015) ("Since 1970, twenty-two states have decriminalized the bulk of minor
traffic offenses . . . .").
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individuals charged with driving on a suspended license.5 7 Hawaii
undertook a thorough examination of its noncriminal codes in order to
decriminalize regulatory offenses that once carried the potential for
incarceration.58 In addition to marijuana possession, Massachusetts
decriminalized the first-time offenses of disturbing the peace and
operating a vehicle while uninsured or with a suspended license.5 9 In
California, disturbing the peace and petty theft are wobblers that
prosecutors can charge either as misdemeanors or infractions.6 0
Decriminalization offers substantial benefits to defendants as
well as the state, with potential salutary effects for the entire criminal
system.
A. For Defendants
For defendants, the most obvious benefit is the elimination of
incarceration, a punishment that the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized to be "different in kind" from any other. 6 1 The harms of
incarceration are in many ways unique: not only are incarcerated
defendants deprived of their liberty but they may also experience severe
collateral burdens including the threat of violence, rape, and disease. 62
Incarceration also has well-known psychological and stigmatizing
effects, and many conclude that incarceration is itself criminogenic.6 3
57. Austin Jenkins, Nearly 300,000 Wash. Drivers Suspended for Failureto Pay Tickets, NPR
(July 22, 2011, 8:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=138627811,
archived at http://perma.cc/3YG7-QT6D.
58. THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28, at 5 (including reclassifications of
agricultural, animal, conservation, and transportation offenses).
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 53(b) (West 2014); COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, supra note 53, at 15-16.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 2014) (defining prosecutorial discretion); id. § 415
(disturbing the peace); id. § 490.1(a) (petty theft).
61. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); see also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
203 (2001) ("[A]ny amount of actual jail time has [constitutional] significance.").
62. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword:IncarcerationAmerican-Style, 3 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REV. 237,
241 (2009) (charting the numerous ways that the American predilection for incarceration "create s]
a class of permanently marginalized and degraded noncitizens, marked out by the fact of their
incarceration for perpetual social exclusion and ongoing social control"); see also COMM'N ON
SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT

http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/
11-14,
(2006)
available at
ConfrontingConfinement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5CRX-4JRX (documenting physical
dangers ofjails and prisons).
63. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (referring to California's "criminogenic"
CRIME
http://
ON
prison
system);
see
also Statement of Principles, RIGHT
archived at
www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/,
http://perma.cclYV5W-M4GV ("[I]n some instances, [prisons] have the unintended consequence of
hardening nonviolent, low-risk offenders-making them a greater risk to the public than when
they entered.").

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1072

[Vol. 68:4:1055

In sum, the simple move of reducing incarceration offers numerous,
deep, and important benefits.
Defendants also gain from other aspects of decriminalization,
although as described below, these benefits sometimes evaporate in
practice and over time. Where offenses have been reclassified as civil,
defendants can avoid accruing a criminal record and its attendant social
stigma, particularly for employment purposes. 64 For fine-only offenses,
defendants who can afford it can terminate their contact with the
criminal process

simply by paying the fine. 65 Where

police are

constrained from arresting offenders, defendants avoid the intrusions
and fear associated with being arrested and having an arrest record. In
addition, the very decision to decriminalize an offense signals that
society deems the underlying conduct to be less culpable, thereby
relieving the defendant of the stigma associated with traditional
criminal conduct. 66
B. For the State
For the state, decriminalization offers immense savings in the
costs of prosecution, incarceration, and defense counsel. In Oregon, the
average cost of processing a single jailable misdemeanor-including
prosecution, defense, and court costs, but not actual incarceration
costs-is $1,697.67 In Chicago, estimates of the costs of a single
marijuana arrest range from $1,600 to $7,200.68 One report estimates
potential savings of over $1 billion if states were to decriminalize half
of their marijuana possession and disorderly conduct-type offenses. 69
The decriminalization of "driving with a suspended license"-an offense
64. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 32L (West 2014) (prohibiting the creation of
a criminal record for the infraction of marijuana possession).
65. But see infra Part V (general poverty of the defendant population makes fines more
onerous than they appear at first blush).
66. See generally HUSAK, supra note 26 (discussing the consequences of recreational drug
use criminalization).
67.

HEIDI BLAINE ET AL., DEP'T OF PLANNING, PUB. POL'Y & MGMT., THE COSTS ASSOCIATED

WITH PROSECUTING CRIME IN OREGON 12 (2010), http://library.state.or.us/repository/201O/
201007161627305/index.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6WR6-4BSL; see also ROBERT C.
BORUCHOWITZ, AM. CONSTITUTION SoC'Y, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS COULD
SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 4, (2010),

available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Boruchowitz_-_Misdemeanors.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/JC6R-BPY8 (finding similar costs associated with the prosecution of minor
marijuana offenses).
68.
KATHLEEN KANE-WILLIS ET AL., PATCHWORK POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF ARRESTS AND
(2014),
available at
17
IN
ILLINOIS
MISDEMEANORS
MARIJUANA
FOR
TICKETS

www.roosevelt.edu/-/media/Files/pdfs/CAS/ICDPIPatchworkPolicyFullReport.ashx,
http://perma.cc/2L96-QQLY.
69.

BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 67, at 4.

archived at
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that constitutes up to a third of many misdemeanor dockets--could save
an additional billion dollars.7 0 Decriminalization also potentially
benefits the entire law enforcement apparatus, since shifting resources
away from minor offenses theoretically permits police and prosecutors
to devote scarce resources to more serious and violent crimes.7 1
Alarmed by the crisis in indigent defense, numerous
commentators have zeroed in on the potential savings to the defense
bar. 7 2 Misdemeanors drive much of the infamous public defender
overload. 73 While the ABA recommends misdemeanor caseloads of no
more than four hundred cases per year, numerous offices maintain
caseloads much higher, from 650 in San Francisco to 1,200 in Dallas to
2,400 in Chicago to a mind-boggling 18,700 in Louisiana. 74 By
decriminalizing minor offenses, hundreds of thousands of offenders
would no longer be entitled to counsel, saving defender offices millions
of dollars and permitting defense attorneys to concentrate on more
serious cases.
In 2008, Massachusetts created a noncriminal civil offense
specifically designed to eliminate the criminal and collateral
consequences of a minor marijuana conviction. Its decriminalization
statute reads in part:
[Plossession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil offense, subjecting an
offender ... to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the marihuana, but
not to any other form of criminal or civil punishment or disqualification... . [N]either the
Commonwealth nor any of its political subdivisions or their respective agencies,
authorities or instrumentalities may impose any form of penalty, sanction or
disqualification on an offender for possessing an ounce or less of marihuana. [For
example] possession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall not provide a basis to deny
an offender student financial aid, public housing or any form of public financial assistance
including unemployment benefits, to deny the right to operate a motor vehicle or to
disqualify an offender from serving as a foster parent or adoptive parent. Information
concerning the offense of possession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall not be deemed

70. Id. at 1 nn. 1 & 4.
71. See KANE-WILLIS ET AL., supra note 68, at 16-17 (quoting Chicago Mayor Rahm
Emmanuel as supporting marijuana decriminalization based on its potential savings in police
time).
72. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the
Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2329-32 (2013); John D. King,
Beyond "Life and Liberty'" The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013);
Roberts, supra note 20, at 331-33 (2011) (arguing that legislatures should "move minor
misdemeanors out of the criminal system").
73. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131-32 (W.D. Wash. 2013)
(finding that immense misdemeanor caseloads and lack ofresources available to appointed counsel
prevented the formation of a "basic representational relationship" between defendant and counsel
in violation of the Sixth Amendment).
74.

NAT'L ASSOc. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 15, at 21; Dashka Slater, Mr.

Public Defender, CAL. LAW. (May 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/33YG-FPFW.

http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=909468,
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The decriminalization of marijuana and two other low-level
offenses has saved Massachusetts over $7 million in the cost of counsel
alone. 76 In an era of overcrowded dockets and jails, this type of
decriminalization offers relief to public defenders, prosecutors, and
courts alike.
C. For the System
Above and beyond these concrete benefits to defendants and the
state, decriminalization is a powerful form of normative recalibration,
an opportunity to adjust criminal rules when they violate popular
understandings of what should be punished and by how much. And if
ever an era was crying out for recalibration, this is it. The U.S. criminal
system is widely recognized as overly broad and spectacularly harsh,
even by the people who run it. 7 While long felony sentences drive much
of this perception, the misdemeanor process is a significant contributor
as well. As television evangelical and former Republican presidential
candidate Pat Robertson recently opined:
I just think it's shocking how many of these young people wind up in prison and they get
turned into hardcore criminals because they had a possession of a very small amount of
controlled substance. The whole thing is crazy. We've said, "we're conservative, we're
8
tough on crime." That's baloney. It's costing us billions and billions of dollars.

In a similar vein, the New York Times ran a scathing story about
people sent to jail for the minor crime of putting their feet up on a
subway seat, including a diabetic who had lifted his leg to inject himself
with insulin.7 9 The story also covered Michael Weaver, a construction
§

32L (West 2014).

75.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C,

76.

COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 53, at 15 (quoting Anthony

Benedetti, Massachusetts Chief Public Defender).
77.
Editorial Board, Justice Kennedy's Plea to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/opinion/sunday/justice-kennedys-plea-to-congress.html?_r=0,
archivedat http://perma.cc/T7DG-ULZA (quoting Justice Kennedy as telling Congress "I think it's
broken," referring to the American criminal justice system); Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates, San
Francisco, California (Aug. 12, 2013) ("[T]oo many Americans go to too many prisons for far too
long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason."); see also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2005).

78. Ariel Edwards-Levy, Pat Robertson Calls for Relaxed Marijuana Possession Laws,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/06/patrobertson-marijuana-pot-_n_1324828.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GKD4-E38V.
79. Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax If You Want, But Don't Put Your Feet Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-offense-on-nysubway-can-bring-ticket-or-handcuffs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/
6VV4-XWNZ.
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worker who went to jail for falling asleep on the subway early in the
morning after Thanksgiving dinner. His crime: leaning against the
empty seat next to him in violation of the prohibition against taking up
two seats. As his Legal Aid lawyer pointed out, such cases can "make
people lose faith in our criminal justice system."8 0
Scholars have long noted that the moral authority of the justice
system suffers when it criminalizes behaviors in which many people
nevertheless engage. 8 ' "On one hand, the law as written sends a serious
message about the wrongfulness of prohibited conduct. On the other
hand, the law as understood sends a wildly different message: that the
moral authority of the criminal law is not all that weighty after
all . . . ."82 Procedural justice scholarship similarly emphasizes that
aggressive enforcement of minor offenses can undermine public respect
for and obedience to criminal laws where enforcement is perceived as
unfair or disrespectful. 83 For minor offenses-which are routinely
disobeyed, perceived as overly punitive, or enforced in a disrespectful or
discriminatory manner-decriminalization offers a way of healing
these normative erosions.
Finally, decriminalization holds special promise as a way to ease
the racial imbalance that plagues the U.S. criminal system, improving
its relationship to communities of color and the perception that it
indiscriminately sweeps up young black men. This promise is
particularly attractive given the growing public consensus that racism
remains a primary blot on the system's moral and democratic
legitimacy. 84 Minor offenses are prone to racialized enforcement; order-

80. Id.
81. William Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1874-75, 1879 (2000)
(discussing Prohibition and the War on Drugs).
82. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1425 (2002).
83. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policingat a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
335, 343, 347 (2011) (discussing public responses to police crackdowns on minor offenses); see also
K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive OrderMaintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271 (2009) (arguing that because the
misdemeanor process so lacks procedural regularity, it imposes additional legitimacy costs when
it is overused by order maintenance policing).
84. Holder, supra note 77 (acknowledging that "young black and Latino men are
disproportionately likely to become involved in our criminal justice system" and that "people of
color often face harsher punishments than their peers"); see also Reevaluating the Effectiveness of
Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky) ("[T]he majority of illegal drug users
and dealers nationwide are white, three-fourths of all people in prison for drug offenses have been
African American or Latino."); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE

UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Aug. 2013) (concluding that "the United States is in
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maintenance crimes like loitering, trespassing, and marijuana
possession have become infamous as police tools for controlling and
criminalizing black men. 85 Similarly, police often use misdemeanors

such as disorderly conduct and resisting arrest to discipline men of
color. 86 These arrests translate easily and often into convictions, with

attendant stigma and social burdens that can last a lifetime.
It is precisely because misdemeanors produce so much
racialization that the decision to decriminalize them can reduce the
racial skew of petty-offense law enforcement. When minor offenses stop
generating arrests, arrest records, searches, jailtime, or a criminal
conviction, hundreds of thousands of African American men could avoid
the harshest consequences of criminalization.8 7
The connection between racial justice and decriminalization has
not been lost on the political sphere. Three 2014 mayoral candidates in
the District of Columbia voted for marijuana decriminalization citing
the need for "social justice"-although all D.C. citizens use marijuana
at the same rates, African Americans were eight times as likely to be
arrested for it as were whites.8 8 In 2012, Governor Andrew Cuomo
floated a marijuana decriminalization proposal in response to the furor
over New York's racially biased stop-and-frisk policies. 89 When the
proposal failed legislatively, Brooklyn District Attorney Ken
Thompson-the borough's first African American D.A.-pledged to
implement it anyway.90

violation of its obligations under . . . the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
ensure that all its citizens-regardless of race-are treated equally under the law.").
85.

PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE'S EASTERN DISTRICT

(2009) (describing how Baltimore police use loitering arrests as a way of controlling and sending
messages to young black men in high-crime neighborhoods); Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops:
One Man Stands Up to the NYPD's Apartheid-like Trespassing Crackdown, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct.
20, 2007, http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/, archived at http://
perma.cc/UH3Q-9YCM (describing similar use of trespassing in New York).
86. E.g., Eric Nalder, "Obstructing"Justice: Blacks Are Arrested on "Contempt of Cop"
Charge at Higher Rate, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 28, 2008, at Al ("AfricanAmericans are arrested for the sole crime of obstructing eight times as often as whites.").
87. Paul Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176,
2191 (2013) ("What poor people, and black people, need from criminal justice is to be stopped less,
arrested less, prosecuted less, incarcerated less.").
88. David Weigel, You Have the Right to Toke, SLATE.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/politics/2014/01/marijuana-decriminalization
will-con
gress-stopdcfrom-reducing-potsmoking.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/7DC8-QYTM.
89.
Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Seeks Cut in Frisk Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/nyregion/cuomo-seeks-cut-in-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html?pag
ewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/7W3W-XS2Z.
90
Christopher Robbins, Brooklyn DA Vows to Decriminalize Small Amounts of Marijuana,
Despite Cuomo's Reversal, GOTHAMIST, (Jan. 8, 2014), http://gothamist.com/2014/01/08/
brooklyn da vows to decriminalizes.php, archived at http://perma.cclWEB5-66M5.
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To be sure, the United States is far from a full embrace of
decriminalization. 91 Outside the marijuana context, only a few states
have engaged in substantial reform beyond traffic offenses, and even
that remains partial: most jurisdictions retain police and prosecutorial
power to arrest and incarcerate for minor conduct. 92 Even marijuana
decriminalization still has opponents.9 3 But as the country grapples
with the thirty-year legacies of zero-tolerance policing and mass
incarceration, decriminalization is increasingly seen as an attractive
response. It offers relief from the crushing burdens imposed on
defendants, the enormous financial costs to the state, and may even
shore up the waning legitimacy of a bloated and harsh system infamous
for its racial imbalance.
V. THE DARK SIDE OF DECRIMINALIZATION
Despite its many benefits, decriminalization can pose significant
threats to the very values it seems to support. This paradox arises in
several ways. First, the most common forms of partial decriminalization
retain many punitive features while stripping defendants of counsel
and other procedural protections. Although decriminalization scales
back certain aspects of the criminal process, its net-widening effects
ironically can expand the overall reach of the penal state. Finally,
because the fines and fees associated with infractions and minor
offenses are a major funding source for lower courts and struggling
municipalities, decriminalization makes it easier and more attractive

91.
See, e.g., NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND
DEGRADING: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 6-9 (2013), http://www.nlchp.org/CruelInhuman-andDegrading

archived at http://perma.cc/XE34-SFWK (documenting numerous minor offenses including
loitering and disorderly conduct that effectively criminalize the homeless).
92. THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28 (finding that few states have been successful
at full decriminalization).
93. E.g., Luke Broadwater, Mayor Says She Won't Wave the 'Schmoke Flag of Legalization'
for Marijuana, BALT. SUN (Jan. 15, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-01-15/newsfbalmayor-says-she-wont-wave-schmoke-flag-of-legalization-for-marijuana-20140115 1_marijuanalegalization-flag-maryland, archived at http://perma.ccl5MLC-KZD8 (documenting Baltimore
Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake's opposition to decriminalization); Lisa Provence, Disorderly
Solution? DeatonProposes New Pot PossessionCharge, HOOK (Charlottesville, VA), Feb. 27, 2013,
https://www.readthehook.com/109175/disorderly-conduct-deaton-proposes-new-pot-possessioncharge, archived at http://perma.cc/HGM5-AJLQ (reporting that during City Council vote in which
Council declined to decriminalize marijuana, prosecutorial candidate argued that "if a person
makes a mistake, they should be punished"); see also Kristen Gwynne, Legalization's Biggest
Enemies: Meet the Drug Warriors Working to Roll Back Hard-Won Advances in MarijuanaPolicy,
ROLLING STONE, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ legalizations-biggestenemies-20130117, archived at http://perma.cclVDX5-LEC2 (surveying influential policymakers
and organizations opposed to decriminalization).
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to extract revenue from low-income, socially vulnerable populations. In
effect, decriminalization represents the expansion of a different model
of criminal justice: a less retributive, more informal, heavily class- and
race-inflected mode of light-handed punishment, indirect social
stratification, and control.
A. They Never Called It Punishment
The implicit deal behind decriminalization is essentially to
promise lesser punishments in exchange for reduced procedural
protections. Or to put it another way, when punishments are
sufficiently minor, we make it easier to label people as criminals in the
first instance. The most important feature of this deal is the trade-off
between incarceration and the right to counsel because a defendant who
cannot be incarcerated for the underlying offense is not entitled to
representation. 9 4 But there are other procedural trade-offs. For
example, when Connecticut decriminalized marijuana possession, it
reduced the burden of proof at trial to a preponderance of the evidence.9 5
Likewise, some infraction courts run on a more informal model than
traditional courts. 96 The underlying justification is that defendants who
face minor punishments can fairly be required to fend for themselves
against the state without counsel or the stringent procedural
protections triggered by the threat of incarceration. 9
When offenses are fully decriminalized-reclassified as civil
with no possibility of arrest, incarceration, or criminal stigmadefendants do indeed face lesser formal punishments. But much of
decriminalization is only partial, leaving uncounseled defendants
unprotected against the significant punitive effects of decriminalized
offenses. And in fact, even where offenses have been fully
decriminalized and reclassified as civil, the consequences of being
labeled an "offender" do not disappear, and defendants may be further
punished in informal and unauthorized ways due to the sloppy, punitive
nature of the misdemeanor system more generally.

94. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (holding defendants are not entitled to counsel
if they cannot be incarcerated for the underlying offense); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)
(same).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-164n(h)-(i) (West 2015).
96.

AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S NEw DEBTORS'

PRISONS (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny-web.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/ 76QP-BLH9 (discussing the operations of Mayor's Courts).
97. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (holding the right to counsel necessary to
protect even misdemeanor defendant "in a case that actually leads to imprisonment").
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1. Arrest
In a few jurisdictions, decriminalized civil infractions do not
provide a basis for arrest or detention under state law. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court recently held that, because marijuana
possession is no longer a crime in that state, it cannot serve as the basis
for an arrest or search incident to arrest.9 8 But not all states
operationalize decriminalization in this way. California permits arrests
for marijuana possession even though the offense is a fine-only
infraction. 99 Similarly, in Nebraska, although some drug infractions do
not trigger arrest authority, police can nevertheless arrest if they have
"reasonable grounds to believe that .. . such action is necessary in order
to carry out legitimate investigative functions."10 0
These state law developments dovetail with the Supreme
Court's holdings that full custodial arrests are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment for nonjailable civil offenses,1 0 1 even when state
law expressly prohibits it.102 Indeed, just last year in Florence v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders, the Supreme Court upheld the strip search and
six-day incarceration of a man arrested for civil contempt for failure to
pay a fine, a noncriminal, nonjailable offense under New Jersey law.1 03
98. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 985 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Mass. 2013); see also Commonwealth
v. Keefner, 961 N.E.2d 1083 (Mass. 2012) (deciding that evidence defendant was sharing
marijuana with others and had a prior record of distribution was insufficient to establish probable
cause for his arrest for the crime of possession with intent to distribute); Doe v. Metro. Police Dep't,
445 F.3d 460, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a state statute that is unambiguously civil in
nature cannot constitute a proper basis for arrest).
99. In several unpublished opinions, California courts have upheld arrests for marijuana
possession notwithstanding decriminalization. See, e.g., People v. Bester, A137728, 2014 WL
710961 (Cal. App. Feb. 25, 2014); People v. Delery, B240204, 2013 WL 5209821 (Cal. App. Sept.
17, 2013). CAL. PENAL CODE § 19.6 (West 2014) defines infraction in a way that appears to
contemplate arrest:
An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment. A person charged with an infraction
shall not be entitled to a trial by jury. A person charged with an infraction shall not be
entitled to have the public defender or other counsel appointed at public expense to
represent him or her unless he or she is arrested and not released on his or her written
promise to appear, his or her own recognizance, or a deposit of bail.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 840 (authorizing arrests for infractions); People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59
(Cal. 2002) (full custodial arrest permissible for nonjailable infraction); People v. Waxler, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 822, 828-30 (Ct. App. 2014) (smell of burnt marijuana furnished probable cause to search
vehicle notwithstanding California's decision to "reduce the penalty associated with possession of
up to one ounce of marijuana").
100. State v. Petersen, 676 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Sassen, 484
N.W.2d 469, 472-473 (Neb. 1992)); see also United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir.
2010) (upholding constitutionality of arrest for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, a
civil infraction under Nebraska law).
101. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
102. Virginia. v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
103. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
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As a result, numerous federal courts have upheld the constitutionality
of arrests for fine-only civil offenses.1 04 In those jurisdictions where
offenses have only been partially decriminalized into nonjailable
misdemeanors, arrest remains fully available. 0 5
This legal reality conflicts with the popular perception that
infractions are nonarrestable.1 06 That perception is not baseless: many
decriminalized offenses do instruct police to issue summonses in lieu of
arrest, and as a practical matter, decriminalization often leads to
reductions in arrest rates.1 07 But the loopholes described above mean
that, legally speaking, the reclassification of an offense into a summonsonly infraction does not necessarily take arrest and its concomitant
burdens off the table. 0

Just as importantly, decriminalization may not cure racially
disproportionate arrest practices. A five-state study concluded that
marijuana decriminalization reduced arrest rates but not racial

104. Wayne Logan, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes a More
Intrusive Turn, 46 AKRON L. REV. 413, 423 (2013) (describing unresolved debate over "the basic
question of what can qualify as an 'offense' sufficient to permit arrest.").
105. Although police may arrest, there are other potential constitutional restrictions on police
authority when it comes to enforcing infractions. E.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001)
(reserving the question of whether police could detain an individual outside his home while
procuring a warrant if the underlying suspected offense was nonjailable); Wisconsin v. Welsh, 466
U.S. 740 (1984) (deciding that police lacked authority to search home without a warrant where the
destruction of evidence-the basis for the warrant exception-pertained merely to a noncriminal
civil offense).
106. See, e.g., Kristen Mack, City Council OKs Pot Tickets, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2012,
1
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-28/news/ct-met-chicago-city-council-0628-20120628
pot-possession-possession-of-small-amounts-pot-tickets, archived at http://perma.cc/JEM9-YS84
(describing the "wave of states and big cities that have opted for fines instead of arrests for small
amounts of [marijuana]").
107.

See MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA YOUTH CRIME

PLUNGES TO ALL-TIME Low 2, (2012) (juvenile drug arrests fell forty-seven percent after
available at
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/
marijuana
decriminalization),
CAYouthCrime_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4PQX-TZHA; see also BORUCHOWITZ,
supra note 67, at 6 (describing Sarasota, Florida decriminalization program that reduced the jail
populations and cut arrest rates in half). But see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 23, at 40
(seventy-two percent of all Nebraska drug arrests were for marijuana in 2010 despite
decriminalization).
108. The legal collateral burdens of arrest include being searched, booked, fingerprinted,
detained, and even placed in the general jail population. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510; Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Informal collateral burdens include loss of employment,
public benefits, or housing, as well as immigration and child-welfare consequences. See Eisha Jain,
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015); infra Part V.A.4; see also DEVAH PAGER,
MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (arrest

records easily available on the internet); RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 16 (arrest records
readily available to prospective employers and other institutions).
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disparities in arrest rates.1 09 In Chicago, marijuana decriminalization
led to reduced arrest rates in white, but not African American,
neighborhoods. In fact, after the ticketing ordinance was passed,
disparities in neighborhood arrest rates actually increased. 10
This is because decriminalization alone does not necessarily
alter police arrest authority or policies. In New York, for example, after
marijuana possession was decriminalized, police continued to arrest
young men of color in disproportionate numbers for the offense of
displaying marijuana in public. That crime was generated, perversely,
by the police practice of stopping individuals and ordering them to
empty their pockets. 1 ' The District of Columbia recently, to great
fanfare, decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana,
but the city council amended the bill to include a similar "public
consumption" misdemeanor. One former police captain opined that this
"watering down" of the bill would leave the door open to racially
disparate arrests in D.C. in the same way that it did in New York. 112
2. Incarceration for Failure to Pay
The raison d'etre of decriminalization is to reduce incarceration.
But when offenders cannot pay their fines, they may end up in jail
anyway, even when they could not legally face incarceration for the
underlying offense as a matter of law. This can occur through contempt
proceedings or simply through the sloppy operation of the lower courts.
It often occurs without defense counsel.
A series of recent studies document the widespread practice of
incarcerating indigent defendants for failure to pay fines and fees.1 13 In

109. Mike Males & Lizzie Buchen, Reforming MarijuanaLaws: Which Approach Best Reduces
the Harms of Criminalization?, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.cjcj.org/news/8200, archived at http://perma.cc/N3AX-PA35.
110. KANE-WILLIS ET AL., supra note 68.
I1. See Kaplan, supra note 89 (reporting that, although marijuana possession is an
infraction, young black and Latino men are routinely arrested for having marijuana in "public
view" after police order them to empty their pockets).
112. Jaisal Noor, DC Close to DecriminalizingMarijuana,Maintains Public Consumption as
a Criminal Offense, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 5, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://truth-out.org/news/item/21677-dcdecriminalizes-marijuana-maintains-public-consumption-as-a-criminal-offense,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9LU5-XVF6 (expressing concern about the disproportionate impact that public
consumption laws have on African American youth).
113. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 18; ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 2 (2010) ("Although'debtors' prison'
is illegal in all states, reincarcerating individuals for failure to pay debt is, in fact, common in
some[-]and in all states new paths back to prison are emerging for those who owe criminal justice
debt."); Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration,25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 23437 (2007) (describing the wide arrays of fines and fees imposed on misdemeanor defendants that
lead to their incarceration).
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New Orleans, for example, defendants who cannot pay their fines,
courts costs, or other fees are routinely held in contempt for
nonpayment and incarcerated, regardless of the basis on which they
were originally charged. 114 In Michigan, a mother was held in contempt
and jailed, not for any offense she committed, but for failure to pay jail
costs for her sixteen-year-old son.11 5 In Ohio, clear statutory language
prohibits the incarceration of defendants for failing to pay court costs
or restitution. Nevertheless, Ohio courts routinely employ three
mechanisms to incarcerate defendants who fail to pay:
(1) holding defendants in contempt for failing to pay, without due process, counsel, or
notice; (2) ordering defendants to "pay or appear" and then incarcerating individuals for
the "failure to appear;" and (3) jailing defendants who are too poor to pay court costs or
1 16
restitution, which are clearly civil judgments.

In sum, the fact that defendants are being sentenced to fines rather
than jail does not necessarily inoculate them against incarceration.
a. Constitutional Constraints
To be sure, much of this incarceration is illegal. It is, for a
number of reasons, unconstitutional to incarcerate defendants
sentenced to nonjailable infractions, even when they fail to pay.
Fundamentally, a defendant cannot be jailed for an offense if the
authorized sentence for the infraction does not include incarceration. 117
Incarcerating defendants who cannot afford to pay also may violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 118 The state may not incarcerate a personeven if the original offense authorizes incarceration-solely because he
cannot pay a criminal fine. 119
The equal protection case is even clearer when the statute does
not authorize incarceration. In Tate v. Short, the defendant owed $425
in fines for nonjailable traffic offenses. Because he couldn't pay, he was
sent to the municipal prison farm to "pay off' his fines at a rate of $5 a

114. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 18 (describing incarceration for contempt
as the most common way that New Orleans nonpaying defendants end up in jail; "it happens every
day").
115. Id. at 35.
116. Id. at 43.
117. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (voiding defendant's suspended sentence
because he was not represented by counsel and therefore could not be incarcerated for that
offense); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (discussing magistrate's unconstitutional policy of
incarcerating defendants unable to post bond for nonjailable offenses).
118. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
119. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding state could not subject defendant to
term of incarceration that exceeded the statutory maximum based solely on his inability to pay
fine).
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day, or eighty-five days. The Supreme Court concluded that this
practice violated the Equal Protection Clause:
[T]he statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense [must] be the
same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status. Since Texas has legislated
a "fines only" policy for traffic offenses, that statutory ceiling cannot, consistently with
the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to
pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without the means
to pay his fine. 120

In Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court affirmed courts'
general authority to incarcerate defendants who fail to pay their fines.
Observing that "[a] defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from
punishment," 12 1 the Court held that, while the defendant's probation
could not "automatically" be revoked for failure to pay, the door was still
open to incarceration if the defendant's failure was willful or if he failed
to make bona fide efforts to come up with the fine. 122 But even the
Bearden Court assumed that the sentencing court's ultimate authority
would remain limited by the underlying statute. 2 3 If the statutory
ceiling is zero, it must stay zero for everyone.1 24 As a matter of law,
therefore, a defendant convicted of a decriminalized fine-only offense
should theoretically be protected from incarceration.1 25

120. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
121. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670.
122. Id. at 668.
123. Id. at 670 ("[N]othing we now hold precludes a judge from imposing on an indigent, as
on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law."); id. at 672 ("If the probationer
willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources
to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the
authorized range of its sentencing authority.").
124. Similarly, California's statute that permits a defendant to "work off' fines by sitting in
jail is limited by the statutory maximum. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West 2014) (a term of
imprisonment in lieu of fines cannot "exceed the term for which the defendant may be sentenced
to imprisonment for the offense of which he or she has been convicted"). But the California
Supreme Court has also held that this limitation does not affect courts' authority to fine and
incarcerate under their civil contempt powers. Exparte Karlson, 117 P. 447, 448 (Cal. 1911); see
also infra Part V.A.2 (discussing contempt as a way around the limitations of criminal
punishment).
125. Some states order indigent defendants to "work off" fines and fees through community
service. At least one court has deemed this practice a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition on involuntary servitude when applied to a civil fine but considered it a valid condition
of criminal probation. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 144, 151-52 (N.H. 1981). Where
jurisdictions treat decriminalized offenses as civil, this might constrain the authority to impose
community service on defendants who cannot pay fines.
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b. Getting Around the Bar on Incarceration
Notwithstanding these legal constraints, states have found ways
around the prohibition. 2 6 Civil contempt proceedings are not
enforcement
rather
but
punishment
technically considered
differs from
"Civil
contempt
are
obeyed.
orders
mechanisms that ensure
criminal contempt in that it seeks only to 'coerc[e] the defendant to do'
what a court had previously ordered him to do." 127 Courts can therefore
incarcerate defendants who are held in contempt regardless of whether
the underlying statute authorizes incarceration. 128
Moreover, incarceration can occur without the appointment of
defense counsel. "[W]here civil contempt is at issue, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer
procedural protections than in a criminal case" and "does not always
require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration
is threatened."1 2 9 Many courts routinely incarcerate civil contemnors
for failing to pay fines without giving them a lawyer, even though they
could not incarcerate them for the underlying offense at all.1 30
The practice of using civil contempt to enforce criminal fines is
widespread. As the New York Times recently complained, "[M]inor
offenders who cannot pay a fine or fee often find themselves in jail
cells." 13 1 In Alabama, for example, the contempt statute provides that
"[i]n cases of willful nonpayment of the fine and costs, the defendant
126. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1971) ("There are, however, other alternatives to
which the State may constitutionally resort to serve its concededly valid interest in enforcing
payment of fines."). For example in Connecticut, if a defendant fails to respond to a decriminalized
marijuana infraction:
[Tihe defendant's failure to act constitutes the misdemeanor of Failure to Pay or Plead
to an Infraction, in violation of C.G.S. § 51-164r(a). A defendant can be arrested and
required to appear in court, where that person will face a maximum penalty of
imprisonment for up to three months and a fine of up to five hundred dollars in addition
to the penalties imposed pursuant to the original infractions matter.
CONN. SUPERIOR COURT CHART A: MAIL-IN VIOLATIONS AND INFRACTIONS SCHEDULE PENALTIES
To BE ACCEPTED BY THE CENTRALIZED INFRACTIONS BUREAU EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2013
http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/Infractions/
NOTED)
2
(2013),
OTHERWISE
(UNLESS

CR003B_chartAB.pdf archived at http://perma.cc/6F5Y-BCPN.
127. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (holding that the state need not
automatically provide counsel to an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding that may
lead to his incarceration).
128. Id. at 2512-13 (holding defendant in civil contempt and incarcerating him for failure to
pay child support pursuant to civil law requirements); ExparteKarlson, 117 P. at 448 (explaining
that the CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 limitation on incarceration does not affect courts' authority to
fine and incarcerate under their civil contempt powers).
129. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-18; see also id. at 2520 (describing the disadvantages of a
categorical right to counsel in such proceedings).
130. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 52.
131. Editorial, supra note 6.
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shall either be imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the
court, sentenced to hard labor for the county," 132 and incarceration
under the statute is common. 133 A 2010 Brennan Center report
discovered at least eleven states that "have statutes or practices that
authorize incarceration . . . for a willful failure to pay criminal justice
debt, often under the guise of civil contempt." 134
Legal constraints aside, the reality of the misdemeanor system
is that courts routinely incarcerate offenders for failure to pay with
little meaningful oversight or adversarial check.'13 As the ACLU report
reveals in detail, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, and Washington all
incarcerate defendants for failure to pay fines, often in violation of their
respective state laws or the U.S. Constitution. 1 3 6 In Dayton, Ohio, for
example, even after numerous Ohio courts declared the practice of
incarcerating defendants for failure to pay unconstitutional, and even
after the county Public Defender informed every local judge of the
rulings in writing, the practice continued. ' Human Rights Watch has
documented the widespread abuses in and lack of judicial oversight over
the massive private probation industry, a cadre of for-profit companies
that act as debt collectors for defendants who cannot immediately afford
to pay their fines and fees. 1 38 Such defendants are commonly
incarcerated, in violation of Bearden, for failure to pay fines and
supervision fees they cannot afford.
These practices offer a cautionary tale: the key compromise at
the heart of decriminalization-trading away punishment for weaker
process-potentially opens the door to incarceration despite the
common belief that decriminalization precludes imprisonment. This is
not to suggest that decriminalization is ineffectual. As a practical
132. ALA. CODE § 15-18-62 (2015); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 938.30(11), (14) (West 2014):
Any person failing to appear or willfully failing to comply with an order under this
section, including an order to comply with a payment schedule established by the clerk
of court, may be held in civil contempt," and "[t]he provisions of this section may be used
in addition to, or in lieu of, other provisions of law for enforcing payment of courtimposed financial obligations in criminal cases.
133. BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 49 n. 131 (citing Telephone Interview with Veronica
Harris, Macon County Circuit Court (Dec. 8, 2009)).
134. Id. at 20.
135. E.g., McCormack, supra note 113, at 234-37 (describing the wide array of fines and fees
imposed on misdemeanor defendants that lead to their incarceration); see also Helen A. Anderson,
PenalizingPoverty: Making CriminalDefendants Payfor Their Court-AppointedCounsel Through
Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323 (2009) (surveying ways that states
unconstitutionally extract counsel fees from indigent defendants).
136. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96.

137. Id. at 49.
138. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA'S "OFFENDER-FUNDED"
PROBATION INDUSTRY (FEB. 2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/02/05/profiting-

probation-0, archived at http://perma.cc/85V5-FLLQ.
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matter, we should expect states that decriminalize marijuana and other
minor offenses to cut back significantly on incarceration, as they do
arrests. 139 Indeed, it would be puzzling if they didn't, since that's largely
the point of the exercise. But as evidence from around the country
attests, defendants routinely face incarceration down the road as a
matter of practice and sometimes law if they cannot pay their fines. As
dozens of states embrace the fine-only model for the possession of small
amounts of marijuana and other minor offenses, the counterintuitive
reality is that these fines may translate into jailtime for the poorest
offenders.
3. Supervisory Sentences
Decriminalization does not always shrink the reach of the penal
state. Even where incarceration is unavailable, states increasingly
attach supervisory, educational, or treatment requirements, even to
very minor decriminalized offenses. Popular forms of partial
decriminalization include diversion and the creation of specialized
courts-for drug abusers, veterans, or suspended license violatorsthat temporarily suspend the threat of incarceration as a way of
inducing defendants to change their behavior. 140 These dynamics
extend the state's control over defendants beyond the determination of
guilt and punitive fines and open the door to new sanctions if
defendants do not comply with supervisory conditions.
Numerous states that have decriminalized marijuana
possession have retained a supervisory component. Nebraska's
marijuana possession statute creates a nonjailable infraction for a first
offense and requires defendants to attend a drug course "if the judge
determines that attending such course is in the best interest of the
individual defendant." 141 Minnesota's statute creates a petty
misdemeanor that requires a drug awareness course. 142 Nevada makes
139. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING
INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 22 (2011), available at

.

https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/smart-reform-possible-states-reducing-incarcerationrates-and-costs-while, archived at http://perma.cc/RD2X-SPZW (Texas drug reform mandating
probation instead of prison for low-level possession resulted in four thousand fewer incarcerations);
BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 67, at 6 (describing Sarasota, Florida decriminalization program that
reduced the jail populations and cut arrest rates in half).
140. See, e.g., Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability:
Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573
(2003); McLeod, supra note 45.
141. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(13)(a) (LexisNexis 2014) ("Any person knowingly or
intentionally possessing marijuana . . . shall: [flor the first offense, be guilty of an infraction,
receive a citation, be fined three hundred dollars, and be assigned to attend a course . .
142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.027(4) (West 2015).
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possession a nonjailable misdemeanor; first-time offenders are required
to undergo a drug evaluation. 14 3 Similarly, jurisdictions that have
decriminalized the possession of alcohol by a minor often require
offenders to attend an alcohol awareness course. 144
Because defendants are often required to pay for these services,
the fees associated with supervision and drug testing can become
onerous burdens in their own right.145 In states that outsource these
services to private companies, those companies may charge additional
fees for which nonpayment can trigger the threat of incarceration. 146
Pretrial diversion or prejudgment probation is another common
form of partial decriminalization in which a defendant's case is
suspended pending a probationary period of supervision. Under some
schemes, if the defendant successfully completes the supervision,
charges are dismissed. Under others, the defendant receives no
criminal conviction, but the record still has criminal consequences. 147
The ABA and NACDL both strongly advocate such diversionary
forms of decriminalization. 1 4 8 But the burdens of diversion on
defendants remain significant. For example, in New York, a defendant
who gets a "diversionary adjournment in contemplation of dismissal"
("ACD") 149 will have his or her rap sheet marked for up to a year until
the diversionary period ends-a criminal record that can trigger the
loss of jobs, housing, and other collateral consequences. 15 0 The federal
government requires divertees to "acknowledge responsibility for [their]
behavior," an admission that may preclude future litigation over
guilt. 15 1 In Maryland and Delaware, in order to get "probation before

143. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.336(4) (LexisNexis 2013).
144. E.g., D.C. CODE § 25-1002 (2015); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW

§

65-b (McKinney 2015).

145. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 59.

146. RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 16, at 32-37.
147. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4218 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.

§ 6-220

(2014).

148. COMM'N ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 50; COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, supra note 53, at 14-15; NAT'L Assoc. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note
15, at 7-8; THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28; see also BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 67

(explaining the benefits of such decriminalization).
149. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50.
150. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 67, at 5 (noting that "depending on how the diversion
agreements are fashioned, non-citizens could face adverse immigration consequences"); KohlerHausmann, supra note 21, at 648 (describing how an ACD "mark[s] the defendant's rap sheet for
up to one year"); see also id. at 660 (describing how a public defender advised his potentially
innocent client to accept the ACD instead of contesting his guilt even though the client had lost
his job due to the initial arrest).
151.

U.S.

ATTORNEY'S

MANUAL,

TITLE

9,

CRIMINAL

RESOURCES

MANUAL,

PRETRIAL

DIVERSION, SECTION 712(F), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading-room/usam/title9/
crm00712.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/8PVZ-JP3T.
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judgment" ("PBJ"), defendants must plead guilty. 152 While the
successful completion of PBJ prevents the entry of a conviction, the
presence of a PBJ on a defendant's record can affect the disposition of
future cases. 153 Moreover, these diversionary and probation periodswhile typically less intrusive than a standard criminal probationnevertheless may subject defendants to drug testing, education,
therapy, community service, and other substantial requirements. 154
Various jurisdictions partially decriminalize offenses by
substituting intensive supervision and treatment for incarceration
through specialized courts. Often referred to as "problem-solving
courts," these increasingly popular tribunals carve out areas such as
drugs, veterans, teens, prostitution, homelessness, gambling, and
mental health. 155 This version of decriminalization can help defendants
not only avoid incarceration but also obtain much-needed treatment or
social services, with support and monitoring from judges, social
workers, therapists, and medical personnel. Many such courts also
appear to improve recidivism, although there are wild differences
between jurisdictions and hot disputes over the data. 156
Notwithstanding the many benefits, critics have pointed out
that this form of supervisory decriminalization may actually burden
defendants more than the traditional criminal process. Supervisory
sentences typically range from a year to eighteen months. 15 7 As the
Boston Globe remarked, "[F]or many low-level offenders, the choice to
participate in a problem-solving court instead of going through the
regular system can mean spending a year or more being closely
monitored by the court instead of serving 30 days in jail. Which option
1 58
affords the individual more freedom isn't self-evident."
In these various ways, decriminalization substitutes supervision
and treatment for imprisonment. While this reduces the immediate
punitive impact of the process, defendants may nevertheless remain
engaged in a protracted dance with the penal apparatus even for minor

152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4218 (probation before judgment can be entered upon
defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220 (same).
153. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220.
154.

U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 151.

The Custom
155. McLeod, supra note 45 (describing treatment courts); Leon Neyfakh,
Justice of 'Problem-Solving Courts,' Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 23, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/
ideas/2014/03/22/the-custom-justice-problem-solving-courts/PQJLC758Sgw7qQhiefT6MI
story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8X7-4XUV.
156. Josh Bowers, ContraindicatedDrug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008); Eric J.
Miller, EmbracingAddiction: Drug Courts and the FalsePromise of JudicialInterventionism, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1561 (2004).
157. Miller, supra note 156, at 1556.
158. Neyfakh, supra note 155.
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crimes that the state has decided to deemphasize, or-in the case of
drug and mental health courts-for defendants with medical conditions
that could be treated outside the criminal process. The persistence of
these supervisory sentences reveals a deep struggle within modern
American penal culture: between the urge to move away from mass
incarceration on the one hand and the system's reluctance to relinquish
criminal control over even the most minor offenders on the other.
4. Future and Collateral Consequences
One of the promises of decriminalization is the reduction or
elimination of future and collateral consequences, the idea being that
offenders should not be burdened for life by their minor transgressions.
And while decriminalization can certainly reduce the impact of
conviction, it does not eliminate it. Indeed, uncounseled offenders are
unlikely to understand the wide range of potential consequences that
attach to a conviction for a putatively decriminalized offense for which
they cannot be immediately jailed.
One set of consequences flows from the informal ways that an
arrest, citation, or conviction can change an offender's relationship to
the civil world of employers, schools, social services, and other
institutions. 15 9 For example, records of arrest and minor convictions can
be devastating to an offender's employment and financial future.
Criminal background checks have become ubiquitous in the U.S. hiring
market: in one survey over ninety percent of companies reported relying
on them for hiring decisions.1 60 According to a recent report by the
National Employment Law Project, a conviction is often dispositive:
numerous employers refused to consider applicants with any criminal
record, even misdemeanors. Firms routinely advertise jobs that
included "no arrest" or "clean record" or "spotless background"
requirements, even though such practices often violate state and
federal antidiscrimination law. 161
Even in states that fully decriminalize various offenses, the
record of a civil infraction can still have adverse consequences. In
Maryland, for example, anyone-including employers-can access a
person's civil and traffic, as well as criminal, records online, although

159. Logan, supra note 12, at 1104 (documenting "the gamut of negative social, economic,
medical, and psychological consequences of conviction"); see also Jain, supra note 108
(documenting similar effects of arrest alone).
160. RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 16, at 1 & n.1 (reporting results from the Society of
Human Resource Management).
161. Id. at 13-18.
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marijuana infractions are not included. 162 In states that prohibit the
reporting and use of criminal records or civil infractions (or both) for
employment purposes, the private sector market for criminal
background checks often moots that policy. For example, in 1996 Victor
Guevares was convicted of disorderly conduct, an offense which New
York deems a noncriminal violation and expressly prohibits criminal
database companies from reporting to employers. Nevertheless, eight
years later the database company Acxiom reported the infraction to Mr.
Guevares's soon-to-be new employer, who withdrew his job offer.1 63 In
2009, then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched
investigations into the background check practices of some of New
York's largest employers. Companies like RadioShack and ABM used
ChoicePoint, a background check company that accounts for an
estimated twenty percent of the U.S. background check industry. In
violation of New York law, ChoicePoint's practices included reporting
sealed and dismissed convictions, as well as infractions. In light of this
market reality, offenders may not realize that accepting a conviction for
a decriminalized offense may still harm their future job prospects.
A second type of consequence is formal and legal. In Padilla v.
Kentucky, the Supreme Court recognized that immigration
consequences can be one of the most significant effects of a criminal
conviction.1 64 So too for decriminalized offenses. Nonjailable
misdemeanors are still criminal convictions with immigration
consequences.16 5 And while a fully decriminalized offense may not
technically generate a criminal record, the underlying conduct can still
trigger deportation.166 Indeed, a recent New York Times investigation
found that "two-thirds of the nearly two million deportation cases [since

162. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW

§ 5-601.1(g)

database); MARYLAND JUDICIARY CASE

(2014) (excluding marijuana infractions from the

SEARCH,

http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/

processDisclaimer.jis, archived at http://perma.cc/L86V-TPD6.
163. Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archivedat http://
perma.cclVGE5-ULMS.
164. 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
165. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2013); Roberts, supra note 20, at 297-303.
166. See Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding noncitizen
inadmissible for admitting drug possession to a physician, i.e., merely admitting to underlying
conduct of drug possession was enough); see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) ("Any alien who is, or at any time after admission has been, a drug abuser
or addict is deportable.").
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2008] involve people who had committed minor infractions, including
traffic violations, or had no criminal record at all."1 67
Convictions also impact licenses, loans, and other public
benefits.16 8 Misdemeanors and minor offenses can cause a person to lose
their driver's or occupational license. A drug-related offense can
eliminate an individual's eligibility for student loans1 69 and public
housing. 170 In Baltimore, a misdemeanor renders a person ineligible for
public housing for eighteen months. 171 In New York, a noncriminal
violation makes a person presumptively ineligible for public housing for
two years. 17 2
In addition to these consequences, a decriminalized offense can
alter the ways that an offender will subsequently be treated by the
criminal system itself. Police are more likely to arrest an individual who
has been arrested or charged before. 173 In New York, prosecutors often
withhold diversionary dispositions from second-time offenders, even for
minor violations. 174
More formally, minor convictions can lengthen subsequent
sentences. 175 Although decriminalized offenses are often crafted to
avoid such future effects, 176 they can nevertheless have significant
consequences. Many states offer infractions only to first-time offenders;
subsequent offenses are treated more harshly with higher fines and as

167. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records
Show, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-followminor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/L9DJ-RRJ2.
168.

See

ABA

DATABASE

ON

COLLATERAL

CONSEQUENCES,

http://

www.abacollateralconsequences.org/map/, archived at http://perma.cclY46Q-YGBN (collecting
over forty-five thousand collateral consequences of criminal convictions and infractions).
169. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (denying student loans to any "student who is convicted of any offense
under any Federal or State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance").
170. 42 U.S.C. § 13661; see Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and
Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1218 (2010) (documenting loss of
benefits triggered by misdemeanors and non-criminal violations).
171. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: ConfrontingIssues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 491 & n.185 (2010).
172. Id. at 508 & n.293.
173.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 181 (1965).

174. See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supranote 21 (documenting dismissal practices in New
York's lower courts).
175. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994) (previously uncounseled conviction
could be used to enhance subsequent sentence for different crime).
176. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 32L (West 2014) (infraction creates no criminal
record); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230a (2014) (marijuana civil infraction creates no "criminal
history record of any kind").
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jailable misdemeanors."' Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, even
fully decriminalized marijuana infractions are counted in the
calculation of an offender's criminal history, leading to higher sentences
and ineligibility for safety-valve reductions.1 78 In states that only
partially decriminalize, nonjailable misdemeanors are counted in
future state and federal sentencings.17 9
It is even possible that offenders could be punished twice for
decriminalized offenses. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
multiple criminal prosecutions for the same conduct, but since some
forms of decriminalization impose only civil penalties, the possibility
arises that an offender who receives a civil infraction (e.g., for
marijuana possession) could subsequently be prosecuted based on the
same conduct (e.g., for possession with intent to distribute). 8 0
Numerous courts have held that civil traffic infractions do not trigger
double jeopardy and therefore do not preclude criminal prosecution for
the same conduct. 181

Finally, the entire decriminalization edifice-with its ability to
impose fines widely and without contest-threatens to exacerbate the
poverty of the criminal justice population. This is ironic, since one of the
great selling points of decriminalization is that it substitutes fines for
incarceration. But for the low-income or impoverished individuals who
constitute the vast majority of the criminal justice population, fines
may be insurmountable. In the District of Columbia, for example, the
marijuana decriminalization ordinance originally imposed a fine of
$100; it was lowered to $25 upon recognition that many offenders might

177. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(2) (2014) (second possession offense requires minimum
five days incarceration); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(13) (LexisNexis 2014) (second possession
authorized imprisonment up to five days).
178. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c) (2012); see also United States v. Foote,
705 F.3d 305, 309 (8th Cir. 2013) (counting noncriminal marijuana offense as a prior conviction);
United States v. Jenkins, 989 F.2d 979, 979 (8th Cir. 1993) (counting marijuana infraction as prior
conviction, noting that "[hiow a state views an offense does not determine how the United States
Sentencing Guidelines view that offense").
179. THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 28,

at 11 (voicing concern over future

consequences of uncounseled nonjailable misdemeanors).
180. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 275 (1996) (holding civil forfeiture not
"punishment" and therefore did not preclude criminal prosecution for same conduct); see also Carol
S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural
Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 778-79 (1997) (describing the accelerated erosion of the distinction
between criminal and civil penalties); cf. United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 846 (6th Cir.
2008) (prosecution for both possession of iodine and distribution of iodine violated double jeopardy).
181. Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d 527, 529 (D.C. 1991); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06
C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 553 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009); State
v. Wyatt, No. 42944-6-II, 2013 WL 4500784, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2013).
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well be incapable of paying $100.182 But most states have not made such
adjustments and impose significant fines in the hundreds or-for
second or third offenses-up to one thousand dollars for decriminalized
offenses. 18 3 In Rhode Island, for example, first time marijuana offenders
receive a civil violation and must pay a $150 fine. The fine doubles if it
is not paid within thirty days; after three months it quadruples to
$600.184
The burden of a criminal fine does not end with the fine itself.
Failure to pay can generate late fees, interest, and additional collection
fees.185 As described above, nonpayment routinely leads to
incarceration. 186 Failure to pay can also harm a person's credit rating
and their ability to rent an apartment, buy a car, or get a job.187 Failure
to pay often triggers revocation of a person's driver's license,
threatening jobs, access to childcare, and other necessities.18 8 As legal
debt consumes a larger percentage of an individual's income, it can
displace food, medicine, rent, or child support. In these ways, fines and
fees punish not only offenders but also families and social networks,
siphoning off scarce resources from already impoverished communities.
In a revealing example of how the "process" becomes the
"punishment," the mechanics of the fine process itself also impose
distinct costs. 1 8 9 When courts issue failure-to-pay warrants, the threat
of the warrant may cast a fearful shadow over a person's life, stopping
182. Andrea Noble, D.C. Council Committee Calls for $25, Rather Than $100, Pot-Possession
Fine, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.cominews/2014/jan/14/dc-councilcommittee-calls-25-rather- 100-pot-posse/, archived at http://perma.cc/4XCQ-Y299 (explaining the
change reflected conclusion "that a $100 fine would impose too heavy a burden on households with
a limited ability to pay"). But see Aaron C. Davis, House Republicans Block Funding for D.C.
Marijuana Decriminalization, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/house-republicans-block-funding-for-dc-marijuana-decriminalization/2014/06/25/
archived at http://perma.cclU2GR-WRK5
d6854ba8-fc6e-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35flistory.html,
(describing how Republicans tried to prevent implementation of the new law based in part on the
argument that the $25 fine was too low).
183. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, TABLE: STATES WITH ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION

FOR MARIJUANA POSSESSION, http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/State-Decrim-Chart.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/447M-7ESE (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) (documenting fines ranging
from $100 to $1,000); see, e.g., ME REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2383(1)(A) (2015) (authorizing fine up to
$1,000 for marijuana possession).
184. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(iv)-(vi) (2014).
185. BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 4.
186. Supra Part V.A.2.
187. BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 27; Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and
Conviction, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL. 505, 517-18 (2011).
188. Beckett & Harris, supra note 187, at 517-18.
189.

See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A

LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 30-31 (1979) ("The time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct
result of being caught up in the system can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from
adjudication and sentence.").
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them from calling the police, going to the hospital, and otherwise
interfering with their relationship to the state and other official
institutions.1 9 0 This dynamic is part of a larger phenomenon that Sarah
Brayne calls "system avoidance," in which individuals who have had
contact with the criminal system by being "stopped, arrested, convicted,
or incarcerated are less likely to interact with institutions that keep
formal records, such as hospitals, banks, employment, and schools." 19 1
In all these ways, decriminalized offenses and their attendant
fines can carry numerous collateral consequences and burdens that
defendants may be unaware of, and that may exacerbate structural
inequalities and stratification already produced by the criminal system.
Given all these consequences, decriminalization's signature trade-off
between punishment and process is particularly disingenuous. From
the state's perspective, decriminalization is attractive precisely because
it eliminates the need to appoint and pay for counsel. At the same time,
there is growing appreciation that counsel may be required in new
arenas precisely because collateral consequences are increasingly
burdensome. 192 Decriminalization thus eliminates the right to counsel
with respect to the very matters for which defendants increasingly need
good legal advice.
Perhaps most ironically of all, the decriminalization discourse
itself may contribute to the problem. By advertising decriminalized
offenses as minor or harmless and telling defendants that they don't
even need lawyers, the system conveys to offenders that pleading guilty
and paying a fine will be the last they hear of the matter, even when it
is isn't true. Uncounseled or uninformed individuals may be tempted to
rack up numerous infractions under the misimpression that there are
no future consequences. By the time they learn the truth, it will be too
late.
B. Next Generation Net-Widening
Decriminalization is often lauded as a way of rolling back the
well-known excesses of the American carceral state. But
decriminalization is also a net-widener, enlarging the reach of the
190. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal
Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. Soc. 1753, 1761-62
(2010).
191. Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and
InstitutionalAttachment, 79 AM. Soc. REV. 367, 385 (2014).
192. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment requires counsel to inform a client if a criminal plea may lead to deportation); see also
Gabriel Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers For? Links Between Collateral Consequences and the
Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151, 156-61 (2012).

2015]

MISDEMEANOR DECRIMINALIZATION

1095

criminal process even as it softens its impact. Or to put it another way,
decriminalization makes it easier to label people as criminals. This netwidening, moreover, can further intensify racial disparities, creating
new safety valves for white, wealthy, well-educated, and other favored
offender classes to exit the enlarged criminal process while poor,
minority, addicted, and otherwise disadvantaged offenders remain
behind, unable to extricate themselves.
Net-widening is a well-known phenomenon associated with
many types of penal reform. Over thirty years ago, James Austin and
Barry Krisberg pointed out that well-meaning reforms of the 1960s and
'70s, including "[d]iversion, decarceration, [and] decriminalization" that
were intended to shrink the criminal process, in fact functioned to
expand state control over an ever-growing criminal justice
population. 193
Drug courts-a form of partial decriminalization-have received
particularly critical treatment in this regard. Intended as a more
humane and effective alternative to the conventional criminal process,
drug courts selectively siphon offenders out of traditional courts for
intensive supervision and drug treatment. The institutional effect,
however, has been to increase the numbers of offenders routed into the
criminal system. "The very presence of the drug court, with its
significantly increased capacity for processing cases, has caused police
to make arrests in, and prosecutors to file, the kinds of $10 and $20
hand-to-hand drug cases that the system simply would not have
bothered with before . . . ."194 Or as Eric Miller puts it, drug courts
"work[] to 'widen the net' by providing the police and prosecutor with a
costless alternative to dismissal for those cases that would not go to
court."1 95
Drug courts not only widen the net but also make it stronger,1 9 6
sometimes imposing harsher punishments than offenders would have
received in a conventional setting for their crimes. In New York, for
example, drug court participants who failed the program received
sentences that "were typically two-to-five times longer than the
sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants." 1 9 7 In Nebraska,
"participants who were terminated from drug court received 'the

193. James Austin & Barry Krisberg, Wider, Stronger, and Different Nets: The Dialectics of
CriminalJustice Reform, 18 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 167 (1981).
194. NAT'L AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE
CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 42 (2009) (quoting Morris B. Hoffman,
The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1505 (2000)).

195. Miller, supranote 156, at 1561.
196. Austin & Krisberg, supra note 193, at 169.
197. Bowers, supra note 156, at 792.
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harshest possible sentence regardless of how long [they] participated
and regardless of a lesser punishment if they had been sentenced to
probation and had violated or had simply been sentenced to jail
originally.' "198
Drug courts also demonstrate how net widening can exacerbate
systemic racial skew. Whites are overrepresented in drug court, while
minorities and the poor disproportionately fail the programs. In
California, "drug courts admitted a proportionately greater number of
Caucasians offenders, even though persons of color comprise a
disproportionately large percentage of the low-level drug offender
population eligible for drug courts services." 199 In one Arizona county,
"there were no African-Americans in drug courts and Hispanics are way
under-represented." 200 Because drug court eligibility requirements and
performance measures favor the well-resourced, educated, and those
least likely to be rearrested, "white drug offenders are more likely to
benefit from this 'pathway out' than black drug offenders." 201 As Josh
Bowers concludes, "[H]istorically disadvantaged groups-for example
minorities, the poor, the uneducated, and the socially disconnectedare ... more likely to fail." 2 0 2
This disproportion is no accident. Like other forms of
decriminalization, drug courts are in part a response to the expanded
reach of the criminal system into more politically powerful sectors. 203
As one judge testified, drug courts "would never have come to being had
not middle class kids been arrested, because we had kids of color
arrested and no one gave-you know." 2 04

Drug courts aside, misdemeanor decriminalization widens the
criminal justice net in systemic and influential ways. First, it reduces

198.

NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 194, at 29; see also Michael M.

O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts:Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 463, 480-81 (2009) (reporting similar phenomenon in Baltimore).
199. NAT'L AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supranote 194, at 42 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. O'Hear, supra note 198, at 477.
202. Bowers, supra note 156, at 786.
203. Steven Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric
Regulation of Recreation Marijuanaand the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 359, 36870 (2013) (discussing "whitening" of marijuana use); Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tolerance:
Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 41-42 (2003) (describing
pressures for decriminalization as linked to the exposure of middle-class youth to the criminal
process).

204. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 194, at 42 (internal punctuation
altered); see also Bowers, supranote 156, at 796 (arguing that New York drug courts were an "ad
hoc and undertheorized" political compromise that "deflated calls for more radical legislative
change" to drug laws).
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the externalities associated with traditional criminal processes. Part of
this is financial: decriminalization reduces the costs of counsel,
prosecution, court time, and incarceration. It is also institutional, as
decriminalization eliminates traditional procedural hurdles that
constrain law enforcement actors-the need for formal arrest, judicial
hearings, and the adversarial process more generally. 205 Instead,
issuing summonses or tickets is a cheap and easy way to sweep people
in who are unlikely to contest the charge. This permits police and
prosecutors to convict those who might otherwise never have been
arrested or charged under the old regime.
Decriminalization can also affect performance metrics and thus
alter police incentives in perverse ways. As one report worried:
One reason ticketing may result in net widening is the relative ease in [sic] which citations
can be measured, especially as compared to the metrics involved with more serious crimes.
Police may be incentivized to issue tickets in order to demonstrate improvements in
206
performance.

Decriminalization also threatens to further racialize the criminal
justice population. Wide police discretion and thin adversarial checks
mean that the dangers of police profiling are at their height. Once
people are charged, wealthy, well-resourced offenders can easily exit
the system by paying fines or undergoing supervision. But as
documented above, poor and minority offenders are less likely to be able
to pay the fines, or to find time for and transportation to the meetings
and treatment programs characteristic of decriminalized supervision.
Like tuna nets, the decriminalized infraction machinery may release
the sympathetic dolphin, but it is structured to retain a hold on its more
vulnerable-and more typical-clientele.
In some ways decriminalization even widens the net
expressively, precisely because it reduces the stigma associated with
charge and conviction. The public dialogue around decriminalization
emphasizes the minor nature of the conduct and the insignificance of
the punishments. Citations are low-conflict situations, and pleading
guilty is a low-cost, low-stigma event, often as easy as paying a parking
ticket. By reducing the psycho-social burden of labeling people as
offenders and of accepting the criminal label, decriminalization makes
it socially acceptable to sweep more people in.

205. This dynamic resembles how new technologies eliminate practical hurdles that once
served to protect privacy. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (stating that GPS monitoring "evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community hostility' " (quoting Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004))).
206. KANE-WILLIS ET AL., supra note 68, at 11.

1098

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:4:1055

Decriminalization thus trades harshness for breadth in creative
and pervasive ways. By reducing the upfront penalties and stigma
associated with minor offenses, while retaining authority to condemn
and punish the conduct, decriminalization waters down the immediate
punitive impact of the criminal process while expanding its reach.
C. The Revenue Trap
[M]any officers appear to see some residents, especially those who live in Ferguson's
predominantlyAfrican-American neighborhoods, less as constituentsto be protected than
207
as potentialoffenders and sources of revenue.

Decriminalization is widely lauded as a cost-saver, but no
scholarship has focused on its potential as a regressive tax. 2 08 The
threat arises from the fact that many lower courts and municipalities
depend heavily on revenues from fines and fees imposed on minor
offenders. In Harpersville, Alabama, for example, the small town of
1,700 residents received over $300,000 in fines and fees from its
Municipal Court, money the town used to pay for fire, police, and other
general municipal services. 209 In Ohio, the tiny Village of New Rome
(population sixty) used its Mayor Court-with jurisdiction over local
ordinances and traffic violations-to generate an average of $400,000 a
year. 210 In Ferguson, Missouri, where the police killing of eighteenyear-old Michael Brown triggered protests around the country, the
municipal court collected $2.46 million in fines and fees in 2013,
representing over one-fifth of the city's entire revenue. 211
207. CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (March 4, 2015), available at http://www.justice.govIsites/default/files/opalpressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson police-departmentreport.pdf
archived at http://
perma.cclE9QY-SEKC.
208. A few authorities have noted the possibility in passing, although not specifically with
regard to decriminalization. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal
Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (noting that the role of criminal fines and fees is likely to
grow "as the nation rethinks its decades-long resort to mass imprisonment"); CONFERENCE OF
STATE COURT ADMR'S (COSCA), 2011-2012 POLICY PAPER: COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE
CENTERS 1, available at http://cosca.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%2OPapers/
CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters-Final.ashx archived at http://perma.cclXV68-USA4 ("In traffic
infractions, whether characterized as criminal or civil, court leaders face the greatest challenge in
ensuring that fines, fees, and surcharges are not simply an alternate form of taxation.").
209. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 60-61; see also Martin J. Reed, Harpersville
Mayor: Loss of Court Revenue Causing Budget Shortfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 17, 2013,
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/05/harpersville-mayorloss of cou.html, archived at http://
perma.cc[R7QQ-6TNK.
210. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 53; see also Small Ohio Towns Use Mayor's
Court for Big Revenue: Mayor's Courts bring in Big Money for Small Ohio Towns from Traffic
Tickets, THENEWSPAPER.COM, July 27, 2005, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/05/ 558.asp,
archived at http://perma.cc/H9QA-MEK8.
211. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 207, at 9.
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As government budgets shrink around the country, lower
criminal courts are being reconceptualized and repurposed as revenue
sources. "[Slome localities expect their criminal courts to fund most or
even all of their own operations with fines and fees extracted from
defendants and offenders. Some local governments go further,
expecting their criminal courts to earn a profit and serve as key sources
of public revenue." 212 As a Brennan Center report describes it:
Cash-strapped states have increasingly turned to user fees to fund their criminal justice
systems, as well as to provide general budgetary support. States now charge defendants
for everything from probation supervision, to jail stays, to the use of a constitutionallyrequired public defender. . . . These "user fees" differ from other kinds of court-imposed
financial obligations. Unlike fines, whose purpose is to punish, and restitution, whose
purpose is to compensate victims, user fees are explicitly intended to raise revenue.
Sometimes deployed as an eleventh hour maneuver to close a state budget gap, the
decision to raise or create new user fees is rarely made with much deliberation or thought
2 13
about the consequences.

The Conference of State Court Administrators ("COSCA") has
called attention to "the burgeoning reliance upon courts to generate
revenue to fund both the courts and other functions of government." 2 14
In a remonstrative report entitled "Courts Are Not Revenue Centers,"
COSCA bemoaned the extent to which the revenue-generating function
of criminal punishment "has recast the role of the court as a collection
agency for executive branch services." 215 Nowhere is this concern
greater than in connection with minor offenses and infractions. As
COSCA put it, "In traffic infractions, whether characterized as criminal
or civil, court leaders face the greatest challenge in ensuring that fines,
fees, and surcharges are not simply an alternate form of taxation." 216
In addition to offense-related fines, defendants are increasingly
required to pay fees for all aspects of their own adjudication. The most
infamous is the common policy of making indigent defendants pay for
their own public defenders, a practice validated by the Supreme Court
in Fuller v. Oregon and implemented by at least twenty-five states.2 17
In addition, governments often charge defendants with daily jail fees,
212. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 13; see also BANNON ET AL., supranote 113, at
30 & n.219 (documenting numerous states that use criminal fines and fees to provide general
operating revenue).
213. BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 4.
214. COSCA, supranote 208, at 1.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 1.
217. 417 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1974); see Ronald Wright & Wayne Logan, The PoliticalEconomy of
Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2052 (2006) (stating
that half of all states impose a fee on indigent defendants to pay for counsel); see also
SPANGENBERG REPORT, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES: 2001 UPDATE (2001) (documenting

at least fourteen states that use up-front application fees in addition to or instead of recoupment).
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court administration fees, copying costs, DNA database costs, probation
supervision fees, drug testing expenses, rehabilitation costs, and a wide
array of other charges. 218
Not only is revenue extraction becoming a more important goal
of the criminal process, it is being privatized. Numerous states have
turned to private probation companies to collect legal debt from
misdemeanor defendants. 219 The vast majority of these supervisions are
"pay-only probations," that is, defendants being supervised for the sole
purpose of payment. 220 By its nature, this type of supervision is imposed
only on the poor-defendants who can afford to pay immediately are
spared supervision.
Private probation companies are "offender-funded": they earn
their money directly from "supervision fees" charged to the defendants
themselves. Although this makes them popular with courts, the scheme
exerts additional pressure on defendants to come up with as much as
$100 in monthly supervision fees in addition to the fines charged for
their actual offenses. If defendants cannot pay, they are routinely
arrested and incarcerated, sometimes based on orders drafted by
probation companies themselves. 22 1
In all these ways, lower courts have already been repurposed to
extract
revenue
from
the
poorest
defendant
population.
Decriminalization poses special dangers in this regard. First, it creates
a new array of fine-only offenses, a significant temptation in the era of
shrinking local budgets. 222 Second, it offers courts and municipalities a
low-cost way of generating revenue without the attendant costs of
counsel, jail, or due process that accompany more serious offenses.
Indeed, if courts outsource fine collection to private companies, they can
reduce their own costs even further, albeit while exposing defendants
to additional fees. By stripping offenders of their protections against
charge and conviction, decriminalization thus creates a newly
vulnerable population ripe for citation and fine.
Importantly,
decriminalization
eliminates
the
usual
externalities that naturally constrain penal expansion. 223 The standard
218. Logan & Wright, supra note 208, at 1185-96; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 15, at 36-37 ("Our money really comes from drug testing fees.").
219. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 1 ("offender-funded" model of privatized
probation prevails in over one thousand U.S. courts).
220. Id. at 26.
221. Id. at 57-58.
222. See also Malkin, supra note 140, at 1584-85 (describing how some residents of lowincome neighborhoods perceived community courts and the infractions they process as a system
that "allows them to be targeted in order to provide police overtime and quotas").
223. Beckett & Harris, supra note 187, at 506 (noting that the state's obligation to pay for
expensive criminal processes constitutes an "important check on government power"); William
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criminal process is resource intensive and expensive. Resource
constraints prevent police departments from making too many arrests
and flooding the jails, stop prosecutors from charging more cases than
they can handle, and restrain courts from sentencing more offenders
than probation offices and prisons can manage. 224 It even occasionally
stems the flow of cases when public defender offices can no longer
handle them. 22 5 For decriminalized offenses, by contrast, the
streamlined road from citation to conviction imposes little burden on
the system while promising an almost uncontested revenue stream
from the resultant fines and potential fees.
If defendants don't pay, courts have the most effective debt
collection mechanism at their disposal-one that could not be deployed
in an authentically civil context. As chronicled above, courts now
routinely use their powers of contempt to jail defendants for
nonpayment, even when the Constitution forbids it.226 As the threat of
debtors' prison is surreptitiously reintroduced into the petty offense
process, we should be particularly suspicious of the promise that fineonly punishments will not result in incarceration.
The dangers of the minor offense revenue trap are starting to
gain attention. A lawsuit forced Harpersville to close its lucrative
municipal court. The presiding judge called the court "disgraceful," a
"debtors' prison," and "a judicially sanctioned extortion racket." 227 Ohio
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Moyer called for the elimination of
Mayor's Courts, noting "the inherent conflict in a system that permits
the person responsible for the fiscal well being of a community to use
judicial powers to produce income that supports that well being." 228
As a constitutional matter, court-generated revenue may trigger
conflicts of interest that rise to the level of a due process violation. In
Ward v. Monroeville,229 the Supreme Court invalidated a $100 fine
imposed by the mayor who served as a judge over certain traffic
offenses. A large portion of Monroeville's income came from fees, costs,

Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 533 (2001) (natural
limits to criminal system flow from caseloads and resources constraints of police and prosecutors).
224. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts and
Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 185-96 (2013) (chronicling the rollback of the California
prison system in response to Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011)).
225. E.g., Wilbur v. City ofMt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding
that immense caseload and lack of resources available to appointed counsel prevented the
formation of a "basic representational relationship" between defendant and counsel in violation of
the Sixth Amendment).
226. See supra Part V.A.2; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supranote 15, at 49-51.
227. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 47, 60.
228. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNON, supra note 96, at 52.

229. 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
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fines, and forfeitures imposed by the mayor in his traffic court, and the
Court found that conflict of interest to deny the defendant's right to an
impartial judge. 230 In that same vein, COSCA has opined that "an
unconstitutional temptation may be created by the practice of
earmarking revenue from costs and fees for the direct or indirect benefit
of judicial officers that control the disposition of criminal cases." 2 3 1
Of course, not every court will succumb to the "unconstitutional
temptation." 232 But many jurisdictions
already contemplate
decriminalization precisely for its economic value. Indeed, in what
Thomas Edsall recently labeled "poverty capitalism," the criminal
system has displayed a predilection for imposing such costs on poor
defendants in the name of making them pay their own way. 2 3 3 In a
world in which courts are increasingly deployed as revenue generators,
for themselves as well as for general state coffers, the creation of
completely new classes of fine-only offenses poses special dangers.
Decriminalization could potentially shake out as regressive economic
policy posing as progressive penal reform, a source of government
funding that creates perverse incentives to widen the criminal net
under the aegis of rolling it back.
VI. MODERNIZING THE PENAL PROCESS

Misdemeanor decriminalization turns out to be a complex and
conflicted regulatory strategy. While it promises decarceration, it may
not in fact stop poor defendants from being locked up. It offers leniency,
but it may actually punish and burden offenders in longer, more
intrusive ways than the prior regime. In theory it promises to alleviate
the class and racial skew of the criminal process, but in practice it
releases the wealthy and the socially favored while exposing poor,
minority, and otherwise disadvantaged defendants to financially harsh,
personally intrusive, and long-term punishments.
The workings of decriminalization reveal some deep features of
the U.S. penal system. First, it exposes the true scope of criminal
punishment and the full significance of being criminalized in the
modern era. Mass incarceration has conditioned us to measure
punishment in years and to treat all other forms of punishment as
lesser and lenient. But nonincarcerated offenders are penalized in
numerous and often permanent ways that fly beneath this analytic
230. Id. at 60.
231. COSCA, supra note 208, at 11 (citing Ward, 409 U.S. 57).
232. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 11-12 (explaining how, instead of imposing
a new jail fee, Massachusetts created a commission to study court fees more generally).
233. Edsall, supra note 8.
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radar. 234 As described above, a minor offender who never goes to jail
may nevertheless experience a wide range of formal and informal
collateral consequences, as well as microcontrols with long-term
significance. The fines and supervision of a decriminalized offense can
derail a person's economic and personal well-being. The mark of arrest
or conviction will interfere with their ability to get a job, a loan, or a
lease. 2 35 People with outstanding failure-to-pay warrants often avoid
calling the police or going to hospitals, banks, and other record-keeping
institutions. 2 3 6 These smaller nudges permeate public, private, and
social spheres in cumulatively damaging ways. 23 7 While this web of lowlevel criminalizing effects has been overshadowed by the dramatic
destructiveness and overt controls of mass incarceration, it is central to
understanding how decriminalization, community supervision, and
other decarceration measures still manage to punish people in lasting
and debilitating ways. As we continue to retreat from the mass
incarceration model, these lower-level punishment mechanisms will
become increasingly influential.
This is particularly so because the turn towards microcontrols
quietly preserves the system's class and racial skew. The benefits of
decriminalization redound immediately to well-resourced defendants, a
fact that some use to explain its political popularity. 238 Insofar as
benefits also accrue to the socially disadvantaged, they will often
disappear in the crucible of persistent overpolicing, fines that

234. As Robert Weisberg and Joan Petersilia have pointed out:
[nionprison sanctions are still sanctions that often involve serious restrictions on liberty
and movement. . . . Some of the most promoted forms of alternative supervision, from
the halfway house to the much-touted global positioning systems (GPS), involve the
"carceral discipline" often decried by critics and the modern "culture of control" (to use
sociologist David Garland's words) or as "governing through crime" (legal scholar
Jonathan Simon's words).
Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 10, at 132.
235. See PAGER, supra note 108 (documenting severely reduced employment opportunities for
offenders with criminal records); Pinard, supra note 170.
236. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014); Brayne, supra

note 191, at 385; Beckett & Harris, supranote 187; Armando Lara-MillAn, Public Emergency Room
Overcrowding in an Era of Mass Imprisonment, 79 AM. Soc. REV. 866 (2014).
237. These soft controls and collateral consequences also tend to be impervious to the
interventions of counsel. See Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 13, at 1070-73 (arguing that
defense attorneys lack tools to combat or alter many of the institutional workings of the
misdemeanor process).
238. E.g., Saki Knafo, 'White Men Getting Rich from Legal Weed Won't Help Those Harmed
Most By Drug War,' HUFFINGTON POST, March 6, 2014 (citing Michelle Alexander), http://
archived at
www.huffingtonpost.com/20l4/03/06/michelle-alexander-drug-war-n_4913901.html,
http://perma.cclV26W-GGAN; see also KANE-WILLIS ET AL., supra note 68, at 18-19 (finding that
decriminalization reduced arrests more in white wealthy neighborhoods than in poor minority
neighborhoods).
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defendants cannot pay, and supervisory terms with which defendants
cannot realistically comply.
To put it another way, fines and supervisory punishments
exacerbate social and racial disparities because small burdens
constrain the socially disadvantaged more than they do the well-off. In
Michigan for example, Kawana Young, mother of two small children,
was laid off from her various jobs. As a result, she was jailed five times
for failure to pay traffic tickets. 239 Fines exert little or no influence over
those who can easily pay them, but even small fines can be life-altering
events for the poor and underemployed. 24 0 Similarly, a monthly meeting
with a probation officer is easy for an offender with a car and a stable
job, but next to impossible for an impoverished single parent with no
transportation. An infraction or citation record may have little impact
on the employability of a well-educated white college graduate but can
make all the difference to a black candidate already stigmatized by the
association between race and crime. 241
In all these ways, decriminalization simultaneously retracts and
strengthens the penal system's powers of governance and control,
particularly over the disadvantaged. 24 2 It rolls back the expensive and
increasingly politically unpalatable excesses of the carceral state
without relinquishing its broad policing powers and its differential
impact on the disfavored and socially vulnerable. 243 By rejecting the
overtly punitive and costly policies of mass incarceration, it permits the
massive underlying mechanism to survive in new forms.

239. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 96, at 29-30.

240. Id. at 10 (stating that fines and fees punish the poor more heavily and lastingly than the
affluent); Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 190, at 1756.
241. PAGER, supra note 108, at 146 (finding that white job applicants with criminal records
had a better chance of getting a job than African American applicants with no record).
242. For arguments that the current criminal system is itself a modernization of older
institutions, see, for example MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION

IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2012) (describing the criminal system as a way of
accommodating the civil rights movement while preserving the essence of Jim's Crow's race-based
stratification and control); LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT

OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 196 (2009) (describing the prison system as the fourth iteration of the
"peculiar institution" that regulates race in the U.S., from slavery to Jim Crow to the segregated
ghetto); also see Siegel, supra note 9, at 2119 (describing how "status regime modernization"
strengthens the legal system, allowing it to accommodate modern realities and political demands
and thereby survive what might have been fatal challenges to its authority).
243. Cf. WACQUANT, supra note 242, at 41 (describing "the gradual replacement of a (semi-)
welfare state by a police and penal state for which the criminalization of marginality and the
punitive containment of dispossessed categories serve as social policy at the lower end of the class
spectrum").
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Decriminalization also gives us renewed insight into the tight
connection between criminal justice, punishment, and technology. 244
Many of these new forms of diffuse punishment and microcontrol are
made possible by modern advances in surveillance, information, and
finance. These technologies permit the criminal system to use
monitoring, treatment, and economic constraints in lieu of physical
restraint and incarceration. 2 4 5 In other words, mass incarceration looks
less attractive in part because, in this day and age, the penal state can
effectively track and influence people, their behavior, and their money
without the need to lock them up at all. The move away from
incarceration can thus be seen not so much as a relinquishment of penal
power but an upgrade: the modernization of the socio-criminal
apparatus in an age of surveillance and intrusion.
Decriminalization also sheds light on some seemingly
contradictory historical developments. In important ways, the U.S.
criminal process is shrinking. The national correctional population has
decreased for four years in a row. 24 6 At least six states have closed
prisons, and arrests are down for the sixth year in a row. 2 47 Californiaonce a leader of the prison boom-is cutting its prison population and
easing its harshest juvenile sentences. 248 At the federal level, Congress
244. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 25-26 (1995)

(describing a "micro-physics" of power by which the state operates on and controls the body through
a "diffuse" set of technologies).
245. Sarah Brayne, Stratified Surveillance: Policing in the Age of Big Data (April 2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
246. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES, 2012

1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl2.pdf

archived at http://perma.cclUFV4-TGWL; see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ON THE CHOPPING
BLOCK 2013: STATE PRISON CLOSURES (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/

publications/incOn%20the%2OChopping%20Block%202013.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/
9LKV-YLT6. Although the national incarceration rate has been dropping since 2009, 2012 saw the
smallest decline, and fully half of that was attributable solely to California's realignment. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra, at 2.

247. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 246. Compare FBI, Crime in the United States
2012, Table 29: Persons Arrested (2013), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-29/table_29_estimatednumberof arrests united st
ates_2013.xls, archived at http://perma.ccVCW7-V7L4 (estimating 11,302,102 arrests excluding
traffic and suspicion) with FBI, Crime in the United States 2006, Table 29: PersonsArrested (2007),
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table-29.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 9BEG-7CRN
(estimating 14,380,370 arrests excluding traffic and suspicion).
248. Jonathan Simon, Dignity and the American Prisoner: Brown v. Plata and Jurisprudence
of Mass
Incarceration
1,
4
(2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edufiles/csls/Simon IntroductionMassIncarceration-on-Trialedit%28
1%29.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6KS-CPYK (describing California as going from "the most
extreme example of mass incarceration" to "the most significant planned prison population
reductions in U.S. history"); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 246, at 6 (documenting
ten percent reduction in California prison population); see also Don Thompson, SB 9: California
Juvenile Second Chance Bill, Signed by Governor Brown, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2012, 11:13
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reduced the infamous crack-cocaine sentencing disparity, 249 while
former Attorney General Eric Holder instructed U.S. Attorneys around
the country to go easier on first-time, low-level drug offenders. 250 The
conservative Right on Crime coalition advocates more rehabilitation
and less incarceration. 2 5 1 There is growing agreement across the
political spectrum that the war on drugs is a failed, destructive, and
overly expensive policy that should be rolled back. 2 5 2 Scholars and
commentators say hopeful things like "there seems good reason to hope
the war on crime may soon wind down,"253 "mass incarceration has come
to an end,"254 "the drug war is over," 2 55 and the U.S. has become "a more

benevolent nation." 2 56
At the very same time, the penal apparatus is quietly expanding.
While state prison populations declined in 2012, jail populations went
up. 2 5 7 Supervisory programs like diversion, privatized probation,
community supervision, and GPS monitoring are growth industries.2 58
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/30/sb-9-california_n_1927840.html,
archived at
http://perma.cc/7Q2D-6GZM (describing passage of a bill allowing judges to re-examine sentences
of life without parole for juveniles after they have served twenty-five years).
249. Jasmine Tyler, Congress Passes Historic Legislation to Reduce Crack/Powder Cocaine
3:15
PM),
http://
POST
(July
28,
2010,
Sentencing Disparity, HUFFINGTON
archived at
www.huffingtonpost.com/jasmine-tyler/congress-passes-historic-b_662625.html,
http://perma.cclXN8N-KC4V.
250. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Endorses Proposalto Reduce Drug Sentences in Latest Sign of Shift,
N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/us/politics/holder-endorsesproposal-to-reduce-drug-sentences.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/6XZ3-SQNC.
251. Statement of Principles,supranote 63.
252. LONDON SCH. OF ECON. AND POLITICAL SCI., ENDING THE WAR ON DRUGS: REPORT OF THE
LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY 3 (John Collins ed., 2014).

253. Ian Haney L6pez, Post-RacialRacism: Racial Stratificationand Mass Incarcerationin
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010).
254. Michael Santos, Mass Incarcerationas a Public Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (April 24,
2012,
11:36
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-santos/mass-incarceration-as-apb_1447564.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B53G-6KR8 (citing Jonathan Simon, Mass
Incarceration:From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS 23, 25 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012)).
255. Nick Gillespie, The War on Drugs is Over (If Obama Wants It), DAILY BEAST (Oct. 30,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/30/the-drug-war-is-over-if-obama-wants2013),
it.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XC5A-TGKR.
256. E.J. Dionne, A More Benevolent Nation?, WASH. POST, (Nov. 17, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-a-more-benevolent-nation/2013/11/17/36fc99aa-4e4
6-1 1e3-9890-aleO997fbOcO story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BUF4-E8U3.
257.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 3.

258.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 138, at 12; NATL ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS,

supra note 194; NAT'L AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 148; George B. Drake, Cmty.
Corr. Program Mgr., Nat'l Law Enforcement and Corr. Tech. Ctr., Rocky Mountain Region,
Remarks: Offender
Monitoring
in the
United States
3, available at http://
www.cepprobation.org/uploaded-files/Pres%20EM09%2ODra.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/
3K99-B5VU ("The offender tracking market ... is expanding at a quick pace."); see also Weisberg
& Petersilia, supra note 10, at 132.
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Public cameras, COMPSTAT, gang and DNA databases, and easy
access to personal information have created a surveillance state of
heretofore unimaginable proportions. 259 Defendants are on the hook for
an increasing array of fines and fees that can require years to pay. 2 6 0
The collateral consequences of even a minor conviction-from
employment restrictions to housing, education, and immigration-have
become a new and burdensome form of restraint and stigma. 261
Misdemeanor decriminalization epitomizes this tectonic shift
away from mass incarceration towards other expansive forms of
intrusion and criminalized disadvantage. Decriminalization may reject
the fiscal and human costs of incarceration, but it has not relinquished
the notion that the criminal process should track, label, and control
risky and disfavored populations over the long-term. And its
technologies represent the cutting edge of the shift: fines and
and collateral
supervision, data collection and monitoring,
consequences that haunt offenders indefinitely. Moreover, because
decriminalization eliminates counsel and other procedural protections
for defendants, it actually expands the penal process's ability to touch,
mark, and burden an ever-growing population-the very same socially
disadvantaged population historically subject to the excesses of mass
incarceration.
Politically, decriminalization is a compromise that siphons
energy away from the possibilities for full legalization. This is clearest
in the marijuana context, in which legalization legislation must now
often compete with more moderate decriminalization proposals.2 62 But
more broadly, insofar as the mass incarceration debacle is generating
political pressure to shrink the penal state in fundamental ways,
decriminalization offers a middle way to reduce costs and punishment
while preserving the essential scope of law enforcement and penal
authority.

259. Brayne, supra note 245; see also Kimberly Bailey, Watching Me: The War on Crime,
Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2014) (arguing that privacy deprivations
are a form of racial subordination exercised by the penal state); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution
in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing aspects of the surveillance
state); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 960
(2012) (arguing that we can use aspects of the surveillance state to constrain police abuses).
260. Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 190.
261. Pinard, supra note 171, at 464-69. The ABA's collateral consequence database has
identified forty-five thousand such laws to date. Maya Rhodan, A Misdemeanor Conviction Is Not
a Big Deal, Right? Think Again, TIME (Apr. 24, 2014), http://time.com/76356/a-misdemeanorconviction-is-not-a-big-deal-right-think-again/, archived at http://perma.cclXRL3-B3L9.
262. Compare S.B. 365, 2014 Sess. (Md. 2014) (decriminalization bill that eventually passed),
with S.B. 658, 2014 Sess. (Md. 2014) (legalization bill that died).
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Although decriminalization purports to take incarceration off
the table, it is actually unclear how much it can reduce the prisoncentric phenomenon of mass incarceration. 2 6 3 Most criminal
misdemeanor sentences already involve fines and supervision. 264 If
misdemeanants go to jail at all, they do so briefly. 265 Even when they
do, they are filling jails, not prisons, and thus do not directly contribute
to the long-term crushing sentences and prison overcrowding for which
mass incarceration is famous. 2 6 6 Eliminating jailtime for misdemeanors
is therefore at best an indireet response to the prison problem. 267
Decriminalization thus provides an updated understanding of
the concrete mechanisms through which we now "govern through
crime" and perpetuate

a "culture of control." 2 6 8 Today's criminal

apparatus reaches far beyond the jail and courthouse deep into civilian
life, even for the most minor of offenses. It influences not only the
offender, but his or her family, neighborhood, community, and social
institutions. It operates directly by imposing fines, supervision, and
criminal records, and indirectly by changing social and institutional
relationships. Offenders whose formal punishment is limited to a
nonjailable misdemeanor conviction and a fine may nevertheless
experience long-term restrictions on their earnings, credit, housing,
263. Of the 2.2 million people incarcerated in the U.S., approximately 750,000 of them are in
jail. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 246, at 3.
264. See, e.g., TAMARA FLINCHUM, ASHLEIGH GALLAGHER & GINNY HENEVER, N.C.
SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR

FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR 2007/08 45 (2009) (seventy-six percent of
misdemeanor sentences were nonincarceration community punishments); see also Erica
Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 502 (2007)
("Most defendants charged with misdemeanor offenses that are punishable by imprisonment do
not actually receive imprisonment sentences. Instead, many are sentenced to probation or fines.");
Hashimoto, supra, at 497 n.144 (stating that while there is no reliable state data on incarceration
rates for misdemeanants, ten percent of federal misdemeanants received a sentence of
incarceration).
265. See, e.g., FLINCHUM, GALLAGHER & HENEVER, supra note 264, at 45 (of the twenty-two
percent of misdemeanants who received a sentence of incarceration, eighty-eight percent served
fewer than ninety days). By definition, misdemeanor sentences are typically capped at one year or
less.
266. As a case in point, when the Supreme Court ordered California to empty its prisons,
California's first response was to transfer prisoners to county jail. Schlanger, supra note 224, at
166.
267. But see Paige St. John, Prop 47 Would Cut Penalties for One in Five Criminals in
California, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-ff-pol(California
archived at http://perma.cc/T6YT-LTDH
proposition47-2014 1012-story.html,
proposition responding to prison overcrowding by converting certain low-level drug and theft
felonies into misdemeanors thereby shifting thousands of potential prisoners into the jail
population).
268. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2009); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE
OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY xi (2002).
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employment, public benefits, and immigration. 269 It is this expansive
social "process" that represents the full "punishment" triggered by an
encounter with the American criminal system. 2 70 Because
decriminalization preserves and even intensifies some of these
consequences, it functionally extends the punitive reach of the state
even as it purports to roll it back. 271
VII. DECRIMINALIZATION AS COMPROMISE
For all its flaws, the ultimate value of decriminalization must be
measured against the baseline of the status quo. With the highest
incarceration rate on the planet and a misdemeanor apparatus that
casually imposes arrests, jailtime, and crippling criminal recordsparticularly on young men of color-the American criminal process
needs precisely the kinds of reform imperfectly and only partially
delivered by decriminalization. The critique of decriminalization is thus
not an argument against it so much as a recognition of its limitations.
To put it another way, decriminalization can be thought of as a
conservative response to a radical challenge. If we really wanted to
shrink the criminal governance apparatus and meaningfully
"decriminalize" our democracy, we would legalize minor conduct,
constrain the police power of arrest, and roll back the entire petty
offense process. Instead, decriminalization permits the state to retain
broad powers of punishment and control triggered by the most
innocuous individual behaviors. It also tends to burden the same
vulnerable populations that the U.S. system has historically punished.
Nevertheless, it differs from the status quo in significant ways.
Decriminalization imposes fewer arrests and jail sentences, easing the
threat of immediate incarceration that has crippled so many individuals
and communities over the past thirty years. 272 And although
decriminalization admittedly preserves much of the reach of the
criminal system, it does so with a renewed respect for the principle of
proportionality in punishment that has been missing from the U.S.
debate for decades. 273 In much the same way that the prison was once
269. E.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012); Logan, supra note 12, at 1103-05.
270. See generally FEELEY, supra note 189 (describing the punitive impact of the formal
judicial process).
271. See McLeod, supranote 45, at 1591 (arguing that most drug court models do not actually
promote decarceration because they continue to expand the criminal apparatus).
272. See Dolovich, supra note 62 (on the uniquely destructive human costs of incarceration).
273. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("IfAndrade's
sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning."); see also Sharon Dolovich,
Exclusion and Control in the CarceralState, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 271 n.33 (2011) ("[T]he

1110

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:4:1055

seen as a civilizing upgrade from a violent regime of public torture,
decriminalization should be understood as an incremental move away
from an unsustainably punitive state of affairs. 274
Given these limitations, decriminalization reform should aim to
maximize its two main contributions to a fairer and more equitable
criminal system: keeping people out of prison and jail (decarceration),
and curtailing the power of the petty offense machinery to stigmatize
and burden millions of Americans for their common minor conduct.
These two values represent the heart of the decriminalization
bargain-that reduced procedure will lead to reduced punishment. To
put it another way, if we are going to make it easier to turn people into
criminals, we must make it authentically less burdensome to be one.
In practical terms this commitment means three things: no
arrests, no jail for unpaid fines, and cabining criminal records. Arrest
is a form of both incarceration and criminal marking. Similarly, jailing
people for unpaid fines violates decriminalization's core promise to
eliminate incarceration. And the imposition of a criminal record-for
either arrest or conviction-moves offenders into a disadvantaged
criminalized population who may be forever hampered by the mark.
Accordingly, these three features offer a concrete way of evaluating
decriminalization reform: does it authentically protect offenders from
criminal stigma and punishment other than a fine, or does it engage in
the sleight-of-hand of partial decriminalization? 27 5
Like most criminal reform, none of these results can be
guaranteed by formal rule changes alone. 2 76 They require inter-branch
consensus among legislators, law enforcement, and courts to ensure
that decriminalization actually keeps people out of jail and out of the
criminalized population. The proposals below thus require not only
statutory revisions but also altered judicial interpretation and police
practice.
A. No Arrests
Decriminalized offenses are often marketed and applauded as
"nonarrestable," but as described above, this can be inaccurate both as
a doctrinal and practical matter. 277 Police often have discretion under
frequently disproportionately harsh character of many criminal sentences when compared with
the offense of conviction belies any claim that the imprisonment of convicted offenders in the
United States is driven by a meaningful commitment to just deserts [sic].").
274. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 244 (on the origins of the prison).
275. See supra Part III.
276. Stuntz, supra note 223, at 510-11.
277. Supra Part V.A.1.
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state law over whether to arrest or issue a summons, and even when
they don't, many courts interpret their power to include the authority
to arrest.
As a result of these ambiguities, statutory decriminalization
may, but does not always, meaningfully alter police arrest practices. In
California, for example, the decriminalization of marijuana led to a
forty-seven percent reduction in juvenile arrest rates, a plunge with
ripple effects throughout the juvenile system. 2 7 8 In Massachusetts,
marijuana arrest rates have fallen eighty-six percent since 2001.279 By
contrast, in Nebraska-a partial decriminalization jurisdictionmarijuana arrests remain over seventy percent of all drug arrests.2 80 In
Nevada, another partial decriminalization state, marijuana arrest rates
actually increased ninety-six percent over the course of the decade. 281
In Chicago, decriminalization reduced arrest rates in white, but not
African American, neighborhoods. In some black neighborhoods,
arrests rates actually went up. 2 82

To make decriminalized offenses truly nonarrestable, two things
are required. First, state law must be written to eliminate police
discretion, preclude arrest, and require summonses. For example, in
Chicago, police retain discretion over whether to arrest or issue a ticket,
thus opening the door to racial and neighborhood arrest disparities. 283
By contrast, Maryland's new decriminalization statute requires that
"[a] police officer shall issue a citation to a person who the police officer
has probable cause to believe has committed a violation." 284 Similarly,
the District of Columbia police department interprets their new
decriminalization ordinance to preclude arrest. 285

278. Mike Males, California Youth Crime Plunges to All-Time Low, CENTER ON JUV. & CRIM.
JUST. 2 (Oct. 2012), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/CA Youth-Crime_2011.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/WF5H-YWZQ (noting that juvenile drug arrests fell forty-seven
percent after marijuana decriminalization); see also BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 67, at 5-6
(describing Sarasota, Florida decriminalization program that reduced the jail populations and cut
arrest rates in half).
279. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 23, at 42.
280. Id. at 40 (noting seventy-two percent of all Nebraska drug arrests were for marijuana in
2010 despite decriminalization).
281. Id. at 42.
282. KANE-WILLIS ET AL., supra note 68 (finding decriminalization did not reduce
disproportionate minority contact between police and black arrestees).
283. Id. at 20.
284. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601.1 (2014).
285.

D.C.

METRO.

POLICE

DEP'T,

SPECIAL

ORDER:

MARIJUANA

POSSESSION,

DECRIMINALIZATION AMENDMENT ACT OF 2014, at 2 (2014), available at http://mpdc.dc.gov/
sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/page-content/attachments/SO-14-04%20FINAL.PDF, archived at
http://perma.cc/F7ZR-HASQ ("Possession or transfer without payment of one ounce or less of
marijuana is a civil violation and not an arrestable offense.").
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Second, state courts must interpret no-arrest statutes to
preclude arrest. For example, California courts permit arrest for
decriminalized offenses. 286 By contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court has held that the police observation of a person with a small
amount of marijuana, or two persons sharing a small amount of
marijuana, does not give rise to probable cause that they are
committing a "crime" and therefore cannot support an arrest. The Court
reasoned that to interpret the law otherwise "would undermine the
clear intent of the voters to alter police conduct toward marijuana
users." 287
Of course, as long as the U.S. Supreme Court maintains that the
Fourth Amendment requires only probable cause for arrest regardless
of state arrest law, no decriminalized offenses will be fully
nonarrestable. 288 But state decriminalization efforts can go a long way.

B. No Incarcerationfor Unpaid Fines
As described above, many states authorize their courts to use
civil contempt to incarcerate offenders who fail to pay their fines. 2 89 In
order to protect poor defendants from the equivalent of debtor's prison,
the Brennan Center has proposed model statutory language that would
end the practice of extending probation and parole terms for failure to
pay. 2 9 0 That language could be tailored for decriminalization statutes
as follows:
No defendant shall be incarcerated for civil contempt or given extended supervision or
probation solely because of a failure to make full payments of fees, fines, or costs under
this provision.

Such revisions would also bring civil contempt into closer alignment
with constitutional doctrine that constrains criminal law. Recall that
Bearden and Tate held that equal protection prohibits punishing
defendants merely because of their poverty, and even a defendant who
willfully fails to pay a criminal fine cannot be punished with jailtime if
the underlying statute does not authorize incarceration. 2 9 1 Courts
286. See supra note 99.
287. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 985 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Mass. 2013) (reasoning that one of the
main purposes of Massachusetts's decriminalization statute was "to reduce the direct and
collateral consequences of possessing small amounts of marijuana"). The Massachusetts Supreme
Court has further interpreted the decriminalization statute strictly to preclude search incident to
arrest, car searches, and other incidents of criminality. E.g., Jackson, 985 N.E.2d at 855;
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d. 899, 902 (Mass. 2011).
288. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
289. Supra Part V.A.2.
290. BANNON ET AL., supra note 113, at 21.
291. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
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simply lack authority to punish defendants in ways that legislatures
have precluded. Accordingly, courts should not be permitted to expand
their own criminal jurisdiction and circumvent the Equal Protection
Clause covertly through the back door of civil contempt. This is
especially so when legislatures have intentionally revised the criminal
code to ensure that a particular decriminalized offense will not trigger
incarceration.
C. No CriminalRecords
In contrast to felonies, the public record of a minor infraction can
turn out to be more burdensome for the offender than the formal
punishment itself. Part of the promise of decriminalization is to reduce
this informal type of punishment.
As a statutory matter, decriminalization can, but need not,
the
eliminate the mark of conviction. In Massachusetts,
decriminalization statute expressly forbids the creation of a criminal
record, while in Nevada, marijuana offenses still mark a person's record
with an infraction. 292 Informally, however, eliminating criminal records
is easier said than done. Even decriminalized civil infractions can show
up in employer or public databases, and state laws against considering
such records have been partially effective at best. In this age of
commercial records databases and the internet, it is hard enough to
keep your social security number secret, let alone a conviction or ticket.
At a minimum, decriminalization statutes should make clear
that offenses are civil in nature and do not give rise to a criminal record
or other collateral consequences. For example, the Massachusetts
statute states that no government entity "may impose any form of
penalty, sanction or disqualification on an offender" based on a
marijuana infraction. The Maryland statute provides that a
decriminalized marijuana violation "is not a criminal conviction for any
purpose; and [ ] does not impose any of the civil disabilities that may
result from a criminal conviction" and cannot be included in the
Judiciary's public website of convictions. 293
With respect to the informal impact of a record, numerous
proposals exist to combat the dissemination and use of criminal records

292. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 32L (2014) (stating that no government entity
"may impose any form of penalty, sanction or disqualification on an offender" based on a marijuana
infraction), with State v. Kitt, No. A-11-629, 2012 WL 1349905, at *23 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2012)
(discussing defendant's "criminal history" as including a marijuana infraction).
293. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601.1 (2014).
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for employment, social services, housing, and other civil purposes. 294
For example, Indiana recently passed a law providing for the
expungement and sealing of all but the most serious criminal records,
and makes it unlawful for any person, including an employer, to
discriminate based on those expunged records. 295 The NACDL has
proposed a wide array of comparable reforms. 296 Decriminalization
statutes should follow in these footsteps by including specific provisions
to keep records out of criminal databases, with sanctions when official
or civil actors use those records improperly.
D. Changing the Process
If decriminalization reform adopted these core rules-no arrests,
no jail, and a limited record-it would go a long way towards easing the
punitive burdens imposed by the misdemeanor system. But the
massive, sloppy world of minor offense processing has a way of evading
formal rules, and often the process itself inflicts the harm. Merely being
arrested for a misdemeanor or infraction can expose people to
unauthorized jailtime, incidental fees, and pressure to plead guilty.297
This suggests that decriminalization might require its own
processes. For example, a separate civil administrative system could
protect infraction recipients from the burdensome criminal
misdemeanor apparatus. In King County, Washington, an independent
Relicensing Program does this by diverting people with suspended
licenses out of the criminal system and into manageable payment
programs or community service. 298 The program not only doubled the
rate at which people restored their licenses but also slashed defender
caseloads, reduced criminal case filings by eighty-four percent, and
prevented over 1,300 days of incarceration. 29 9
Decriminalization might also require altering the state's
underlying incentives to punish in the first place by eliminating courts'

294. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 12, at 1110 (advocating a more robust understanding and
public dissemination of conviction information); Pinard, supra note 170, at 1222 (suggesting the
compilation and notification to defendants of each state's collateral consequences).
295. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9 (West 2015).
296. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA'S FAILURE TO
FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME, A ROADMAP TO RESTORE RIGHTS AND STATUS AFTER

ARREST OR CONVICTION, 54-61 (May 2014), available at http://www.nacdl.org/WorkAreal
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33203&liblD=33172, archived at http://perma.cc/FM8Z-PRVJ.
297. See generally FEELEY, supranote 189 (exploring the various costs incurred by defendants
in their experiences with criminal courts); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 21 (documenting
substantial burdens inflicted on misdemeanor defendants whose cases were ultimately dismissed).
298. BoRuCHOWITZ, supra note 67, at 7-8.
299. Id. at 9.
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economic reliance on infraction fines and fees and diverting infraction
revenues away from law enforcement coffers. For example, Maryland
directs all revenues from decriminalized marijuana offenses to the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, which "may use money
received under this subsection only for the purpose of funding drug
treatment and education programs." 300 Such reforms would change not
merely the punishment but the punitive machinery that incentivizes
and delivers it.
Ironically, decriminalization is probably a poor candidate for the
most hallowed of reform traditions: the right to counsel. This is in part
because the decriminalized misdemeanor process is resistant to
lawyering and its legalistic interventions: between bulk citations and
arrests, low-stakes cases, and assembly-line dockets that permit little
or no adjudication, there's not much time or room for a defense attorney
to put up a fight. 30 1 Many of the harms of decriminalized offenses,
moreover, are informal, financial, and social: the sorts of things that
lawyers can do nothing about. More profoundly, the decriminalization
train is gaining speed precisely because so many legislatures and
advocates are hoping to save money on the costs of public defense. Were
decriminalized offenders entitled to counsel, many states might lose
interest altogether, and the question would disappear.
The overarching lesson is that states experimenting with
decriminalization should resist the temptations of the nonjailable
misdemeanor and convert offenses to fully civil infractions.
Massachusetts provides a robust model: a statute carefully crafted to
eliminate the burdens of criminal conviction, judicial interpretations
fully honoring that intent, and police practices that significantly reduce
arrest. Were every state to engage in Massachusetts-style
decriminalization, our criminal justice process and population might
look very different.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Many commentators believe that the United States is not merely
tinkering with the machinery of punishment but rethinking it as a
governance structure for engaging our fellow citizens. If so,
decriminalization in its most robust form might well represent a
counter to the very spirit of mass incarceration: a more proportionate,
300. MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-302(g) (2014). See also Logan & Wright, supra note
208, at 1213 (arguing that all revenue from criminal fines and fees "should go into the general
treasury").
301. See generally Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 13 (describing the inherent limits
of defense counsel to affect outcomes in the misdemeanor process).
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less punitive approach that rejects incarceration and heavy punishment
as a routine governance mechanism.
Whether decriminalization will fundamentally reshape the
landscape is ultimately a matter, not of any one particular reform, but
of this penal zeitgeist. If we are in fact becoming a more "benevolent
nation" and our criminal system is indeed relinquishing some of its
worst racial and inegalitarian features, then we should expect to see
more states embrace full decriminalization Massachusetts-style and
the rollback of the burdens associated with minor offenses. We might
then look back at this era someday, not only as the end of mass
incarceration but the demise of the punitive turn that fueled the
carceral explosion of the late 20th century. 302
If, however, the culture of control is not retreating so much as
regrouping, we should expect partial decriminalization to remain
ascendant, retaining its diffuse punitive hold over an expanding
criminal justice population. History might then recall today's
decriminalization as yet another example of a well-meaning reform that
somehow managed to widen the criminal net and exacerbate social
inequality. Either way, misdemeanor decriminalization will be central
to understanding this seminal moment.

302. GARLAND, supra note 268, at 53; Simon, supra note 9, at 221; see also Carl Hulse,
Unlikely Cause Unites the Left and Right: Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-and-the-rightjustice-reform.html? r=0 archived at http://perma.cc/3FXN-T79W (describing new bipartisan
coalition launching "a multimillion-dollar campaign on behalf of emerging proposals to reduce
prison populations, overhaul sentencing, reduce recidivism and [I similar initiatives").

